

## ▶ Fall 2010

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*New Findings from Recent Research*
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- ▶ Job Growth, Pay Loss and Service Cuts in New York
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- ▶ Latest Trends in Employment and Unemployment



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# REGIONAL LABOR REVIEW

# REGIONAL LABOR REVIEW

## Of the New York Metropolitan Area

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## Job Growth and Pay Declines in New York and Nationwide

by Gregory DeFreitas

Three years since the start of the Great Recession, both New York and the nation still struggled in Fall 2010 to recover from deep job and income losses. While the output recession officially ended when GDP bottomed out in mid-2009, the “jobs recession” has persisted far longer than in similar phases of past business cycles. As of this October, the cumulative net job losses since December 2007 still total nearly 8 million jobs nationwide, and the national unemployment rate has remained just under double digits. In fact, preliminary November estimates show the rate actually rose to 9.8 percent. In some recoveries, renewed job growth encourages discouraged workers to rejoin the jobseeking labor force – thereby temporarily raising the official unemployment rate. But this was not the source of the latest unemployment increase. Rather, it was more layoffs, particularly in state and local governments slashing budgets to cope with looming deficits.

The latest federal stimulus plan, unexpected bounces in holiday retail spending and home sales, and declines in initial claims for unemployment benefits have raised hopes that the economy’s fall might be stabilizing. In sharp contrast to the steep monthly job drops of 600,000+ in the winter of 2008-09, positive job growth has been the norm since late 2009. For example, the monthly establishment surveys in September and October showed a net gain (seasonally adjusted) of 172,000 jobs. Given the end of most 2010 Census jobs and state/local government cutbacks, nearly all the net increase (93%) was in private sector hires. Such signs of renewed private business hiring are encouraging, though the monthly increases have been very erratic and concentrated recently in part-time and temporary jobs.

The insecure nature of so many of these new jobs, coupled with mounting corporate and political pressures for wage and/or benefits freezes and/or cuts have resulted in stagnant or falling employee compensation in much of the country. In New York State, for example, personal income actually dropped (by 3.1%) in 2009 for the first time in 70 years of recordkeeping.<sup>1</sup> In New York City, real average wages plunged nine percent in 2009, the worst such decline in any modern recession. These pressures, together with the weak housing market and high indebtedness, have continued to limit consumers’ ability to spend. But they have also contributed importantly to record-breaking business profits. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, corporate profits in the third quarter of 2010 rose \$44.4 billion, marking an annual rate of \$1.7 trillion – the highest ever since consistent recordkeeping began 60 years ago<sup>2</sup>

National opinion polls confirm that most Americans still see little if any improvement in their living standards or job security. This

concern is understandably deepest among the 14.8 million people officially counted as unemployed in October – a 9.6% national unemployment rate, even after seasonal adjustment. That rate was 0.5 percentage points lower than at the same time the year before, when there were 800,000 more people unemployed. But among the unemployed, over two in five have been without work over half a year. In fact, as more and more have remained jobless for two to three years, the U.S. Labor Department has just been forced to expand its labor force survey measurements: instead of limiting its questionnaire options to a maximum duration of “two years or more,” it will now start asking about length of jobless spells up to a top code of five years or more.

The recession’s highly unequal impacts are painfully evident in Table 1. The year-end jobless rate among African Americans (15.7%) was nearly twice that of whites. In the Spanish origin labor force, 12.6% are still unemployed. The rates for all three demographic groups are over twice as high as the full-employment level in October 2000, the end of the last economic boom.

The hardest hit are youth and less-educated workers. High school dropouts and graduates with no college are two to three times more likely to be unemployed than college graduates. Even if college grads’ jobless rate (4.7%) is the lowest now, it is triple the rate in 2000. Moreover, many college grads are now only able to find part-time jobs for which they are overqualified. Among young people looking for work, nearly one in four white teens is unemployed today, down from 26.1% in 2009, but far above their 11.1% rate in 2000. And almost half (48%) of all jobseeking African American youth are unemployed – a finding made all the more startling by the fact that their jobless rate worsened by six percentage points over the past 12 months.

By some important measures, New York has made faster progress toward repairing the recession’s job damage than most other states. In October, the state added 40,500 private sector jobs – the biggest such monthly gain since April 2005 (seasonally adjusted). The state unemployment rate was still quite high, though at 8.3% it was over a percentage point below the national average. New York City had a shorter and shallower job decline and has had job growth resume more quickly and sharply than either the state or national patterns. In contrast, during both the 1989-92 and 2001-2003 slumps, recovery in the city lagged a year or more behind the rest of the country. Over the 12 months through this October, the city added a net increase of 41,600 jobs – all due to private sector hires (55,400) and inadequate as these gains have been, New York’s job growth rate (+1.1%) is over twice the U.S. average.

**Table 1**  
**Unemployment Rates & Duration, 2000-2010**  
(national estimates, October, seasonally adjusted)

	2010	2009	2000
<b>ALL</b>	9.6%	10.1%	3.9%
<b>AGE AND RACE/ETHNICITY</b>			
White	8.8	9.4	3.4
Black	15.7	15.7	7.3
Hispanic	12.6	13.1	7.3
All, ages 16-19	27.1	27.6	12.6
Whites 16-19	23.6	26.1	11.1
Blacks 16-19	48.0	42.1	24.2
<b>EDUCATION:</b>			
HS grad, no college	10.1	11.2	3.5
College grad, BA	4.7	4.7	1.6
<b>DURATION:</b>			
Unemployed > 26 weeks (as % of unempld.)	41.8	36.0	11

**Table 1 Notes:** Estimates are for civilian, noninstitutional popltn ages 16 and over, except for education subsets (ages 25+).

**Table 1 Source:** U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010).

**Table 2**  
**Number of Nonfarm Jobs (in thousands) by Place of Work:**  
**New York City, Long Island & All U.S., Oct. 2009-Oct. 2010**  
(in thousands, not seasonally adjusted)

	October 2010	October 2009	October 2000	% Change 2000-2010	2009-2010
<b>U.S.</b>	131,594.0	130,889.0	133,007.0	-1.1	0.5
<b>NY STATE</b>	8,612.8	8,577.6	8,719.3	-1.2	0.4
<b>NYC</b>	3,714.3	3,672.7	3,814.2	-2.6	1.1
<b>LONG ISLAND</b>	1,238.9	1,233.2	1,258.0	-1.5	0.5

**Table 1 Notes:** Estimates are for civilian, noninstitutional popltn ages 16 and over, except for education subsets (ages 25+).

**Table 1 Source:** U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010).



Which sectors of the city's economy have been job gainers since October 2009? As Figure 1 reveals, the services supersector dominated the city's growth, adding 44,200 jobs (+2.5%) – accounting for 80% of all private sector job gains. Within services, the hiring leaders were: professional and business services (+17,300, most in legal, accounting and employment services); health care and social assistance (+11,600); retail trade (+8,400); and food and drinking places (+4,800). Smaller but welcome job gains occurred in finance, insurance and credit (+3,600); real estate (+3,400); construction (+1,800); and transportation, warehousing and utilities (+1,000, mostly in airline services)

Job declines continued in manufacturing (-1,400), where the once huge apparel industry lost another 2,100 jobs (-11.8% !) Wall Street lost over 10,000 securities jobs. And the information sector was down by 2,600 positions from a year earlier. Publishing alone shrank by 3,100 jobs, and another 2,000 were lost in the city's motion picture industry. Only television and radio registered gains (+1,100) in this sector.

The steepest job plunge has been in government: there were 13,800 fewer jobs in this sector than a year ago. Job losses have been felt in both federal and state employment in the city, but most have been experienced by local government staffs. And more public sector layoffs are expected as the city and state wrestle with recession-ravaged budgets. For example, the NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation, faced with a \$1 billion deficit, plans to shrink its workforce by another 2,600 jobs in the current fiscal year (half by attrition). Budget cuts are closing some programs outright and merging others. HHC, the country's biggest public hospital system, is the primary health care resource for 1.3 million mostly low-income New Yorkers. But the city's hospital crisis is not confined to the public sector, as the closure of St. Vincent's Hospital Center in Greenwich Village demonstrated recently. Since 2000, 17 of the city's hospitals have closed and more will likely do so in the near future. Their debt loads and annual losses are far worse than the national average. Serving large low-income and elderly populations heavily dependent on Medicare and Medicaid for unusually lengthy in-patient care, local hospitals have been especially vulnerable to inadequate government reimbursements, state aid cuts, skyrocketing pay packages of top administrators, and the costly competition unleashed by former Governor Pataki's deregulation program in the 1990s<sup>3</sup> As more shut their doors, thousands of X-ray technicians, maintenance and other hospital staff will doubtless have a far more difficult transition than will laid-off doctors and nurses.

The modest net job gains in the private sector have helped drive the city unemployment rate down by more than a percentage point over the year to 9.2%. Most major demographic and educational groups have seen their jobless rates improve in the same period. But the recent quarterly estimates (from the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey) shown in Table 4 reveal sharp differences

between large elements of the population. While the unemployment rate is down to 5.2% among white New Yorkers, it is 15.3% among blacks and 13.3% among Latinos. Young people ages 16 to 24 suffer with a still higher 17.7% jobless rate. And the long-term unemployed account for nearly half of all jobless New Yorkers: 49.3% have not had work in over half a year. And one in four of the unemployed have now been jobless one year or more.<sup>4</sup>



**Figs. 1-2 Source:** NYS Dept. of Labor: nonfarm payroll job data from CES CES establishment survey in New York City, Nassau and Suffolk counties. Year-to-year changes, not seasonally adjusted. Note: Constcn. = Construction, Mining & Natural Resources; FIRE = Finance, Insurance & Real Estate; TW U= Transport, Warehousing & Utilities.

Have other parts of the metropolitan area fared any better or worse lately than New York City? Tables 2 - 3 and Figure 2 show job growth and unemployment trends for Long Island's Nassau and Suffolk counties over the same 12-month period. Like most higher-income suburban areas, even during recessions, unemployment there has long averaged well below the center-city levels. Over the 2009-2010 span, the jobless rate dipped slightly to 6.9%, well below either the NYC or national level. Long Island's job growth rate (0.5%) matched the national pace, but was half as fast as downtown. Like the city, its 12-month job gains (+5,700) reflected modest private sector hiring that outweighed sharp cuts in government jobs (-5,200). Services was the largest single sector in net hires, up by 7,000 positions (1.3%), with most in health care, education, and food and drink. Other improvements came in wholesale trade (=4,300 jobs), retail (+1,900) and construction (+1,600). Some 3,900 private sector jobs were lost in manufacturing; information; transportation, warehousing and utilities; and finance, insurance and real estate.

With the state, the city and the suburbs all struggling with tough choices on balancing their individual budgets, there is faint hope of any near-term new hiring in the public sector to supplement recent private sector growth. Even the more optimistic economic forecasts see little acceleration in the modest pace of improvement in private payrolls. For example, the Independent Budget Office now predicts that -- even if the city avoids a double-dip recession and enjoys revenue growth well above that expected by the Mayor's office -- job gains in 2011 will be little better (+41,700 jobs, or +1.1%) than in the past 12 months. These trends underscore the finding that in this Great Recession, even in a state like New York in which signs of potential recovery have appeared sooner than in most others, any firm conclusions about the depth or persistence of economic improvements are still premature.

**Table 3**  
**Civilian Labor Force, Employment & Unemployment**  
 (in thousands, not seasonally adjusted)

AREA	LABOR FORCE		EMPLOYED		UNEMPLOYED		UNEMP. RATE	
	Oct. 2010	Oct. 2009	Oct. 2010	Oct. 2009	Oct. 2010	Oct. 2009	Oct. 2010	Oct. 2009
<b>U.S.</b>	153,652.0	153,635.0	139,749.0	139,088.0	13,903.0	14,547.0	9.0%	9.5%
<b>NYC</b>	3,983.1	3,983.4	3,618.5	3,567.8	364.6	415.6	9.2	10.4
Bronx	540.2	539.4	472.8	466.2	67.4	73.2	12.5	13.6
Brooklyn	1,127.2	1,127.6	1,015.2	1,001.0	112.0	126.6	9.9	11.2
Manhattan	936.2	939.9	865.1	852.9	71.1	87.0	7.6	9.3
Queens	1,132.4	1,131.0	1,039.2	1,024.6	93.2	106.4	8.2	9.4
Staten Island	247.2	245.5	226.3	223.1	20.9	22.4	8.5	9.1
<b>LONG ISLAND</b>	1,486.6	1,477.4	1,384.2	1,372.9	102.4	104.5	6.9	7.1
Nassau County	694.4	690	647.3	642.0	47.1	48.0	6.8	7.0
Suffolk County	792.2	787.4	736.9	730.9	55.3	56.5	7.0	7.2

**Table 3 source:** CPS household survey data from NYS Department of Labor. Note that data reflect regular revisions by Dept. of Labor.



**Table 4**  
**NYC Unemployment by Age, Race/Ethnicity & Education, 2008-2010**  
 (3rd quarter each year)

	2010	2009	2008
<b>ALL</b>	9.5%	10.7%	5.6%
<b>AGE AND RACE/ETHNICITY</b>			
<b>White</b>	5.2	7.7	3.4
<b>Black</b>	15.3	16.4	9.2
<b>Hispanic</b>	13.3	12.5	7.2
<b>Ages 16-24</b>	17.7	29.6	15.3
<b>Ages 25-54</b>	8.7	9.1	4.8
<b>Ages 55 &amp; over</b>	6.7	5.5	3.3
<b>EDUCATION:</b>			
<b>No HS Diploma</b>	16.1	15	12.1
<b>HS grad, some college</b>	11.3	12.4	5.5
<b>College grad, BA</b>	5.1	7.0	3.5
<b>DURATION:</b>			
<b>Unemployed &gt; 26 weeks (as % of unempld.)</b>	49.3	40.7	28.1

**Table 4 Source:** CPS microdata analysis by NYC. Comptrollers' Office (10/2010).

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
**NOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli, quoted in "Income Posts a Rare Drop," *Wall Street Journal* (10/05/2010).
- <sup>2</sup> US Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP: *3rd Quarter 2010* (11/2010): <www.bea.gov>
- <sup>3</sup> New York City Comptroller's Office, *Persistent Disparities in NYC Unemployment* (10/28/2010).
- <sup>4</sup> New York City Comptroller's Office, *Persistent Disparities in NYC Unemployment* (10/28/2010).
- <sup>5</sup> NYC Independent Budget Office, While Tax Revenues Improve, Cuts in State Aid Could Widen Gaps," *Fiscal Outlook* <www.ibo.nyc.ny.us>

## Latest Trends in Key Labor Market Indicators

by Bhaswati Sengupta

Unemployment Rates in  
New York City, Long Island,  
and the U.S., Monthly August 2008  
to August 2010  
(Seasonally adjusted)



New York City -- Civilian Employment and Unemployment, Aug 2008 - Aug 2010  
(Seasonally adjusted)

	Employment (1000s)	Unemployment (1000s)	Unemployment Rate (%)	Labor Force (1000s)
<b>2008 -2009</b>				
August	3677	219	5.7	3895
September	3689	225	5.7	3915
October	3695	229	5.8	3924
November	3668	250	6.4	3920
December	3641	277	7.0	3930
January	3676	282	7.1	3958
February	3666	317	8.0	3986
March	3676	337	8.4	4002
April	3667	337	8.4	4001
May	3659	365	9.1	4020
June	3647	374	9.3	4025
July	3668	384	9.4	4043
<b>2009-2010</b>				
August	3636	397	9.8	4040
September	3608	409	10.2	4018
October	3605	422	10.5	4023
November	3607	409	10.2	4015
December	3588	405	10.1	4008
January	3556	406	10.2	3965
February	3579	387	9.7	3971
March	3588	405	10.2	3980
April	3606	409	10.2	4006
May	3616	390	9.7	4002
June	3612	376	9.4	3993
July	3612	369	9.3	3972
August	3631	366	9.1	4001

Source: NY State Dept. of Labor. These estimates reflect 2010 Dept. of Labor revisions, and supersede earlier estimates. Seasonal adjustments by *Regional Labor Review*.

**Long Island -- Civilian Employment and Unemployment, Aug 2008 - Aug 2010**  
(Seasonally adjusted)

	Employment (1000s)	Unemployment (1000s)	Unemployment Rate (%)	Labor Force (1000s)
<b>2008 -2009</b>				
August	1424	77	5.1	1499
September	1426	79	5.2	1505
October	1429	82	5.5	1509
November	1413	84	5.6	1498
December	1404	92	6.1	1495
January	1395	94	6.3	1491
February	1395	100	6.7	1498
March	1394	104	6.9	1501
April	1392	106	7.1	1496
May	1384	106	7.2	1489
June	1375	111	7.5	1487
July	1380	106	7.1	1486
<b>2009-2010</b>				
August	1382	107	7.2	1489
September	1375	110	7.4	1485
October	1373	117	8.0	1486
November	1372	109	7.3	1480
December	1366	108	7.3	1473
January	1381	107	7.1	1490
February	1383	105	7.1	1491
March	1387	104	6.9	1493
April	1392	104	7.0	1495
May	1391	103	7.0	1492
June	1389	100	6.7	1491
July	1386	103	6.9	1489
August	1391	103	6.9	1494

Source: NY State Dept. of Labor. These estimates reflect 2010 Dept. of Labor revisions, and supersede earlier estimates. Seasonal adjustments by *Regional Labor Review*

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## Can Worker Cooperatives Save American Manufacturing?

by Sharryn Kasmir

In October of 2009, the United Steel Workers (USW,) North America's largest industrial union, signed an historic agreement to open union cooperatives in the United States and Canada. Its partner in this effort is the international division of Mondragón Corporation (MC,) the world-renowned system of worker-owned cooperatives headquartered in the Basque region of Spain. For decades, scholars, policy experts, and activists have looked to Mondragón for a socially just and progressive alternative to the standard corporation. In a press release, USW International President Leo W. Gerard explained,

"Too often we have seen" Wall Street hollow out companies by draining their cash and assets and hollowing out communities by shedding jobs and shuttering plants. We need a new business model that invests in workers and invests in communities... We see Mondragón's cooperative model with 'one worker, one vote' ownership as a means to re-empower workers and make business accountable to Main Street instead of Wall Street.

The Mondragón Corporation began in 1956 in the Basque town of Mondragón. Today, it has approximately 100,000 worker-members in more than 260 cooperative enterprises, concentrated in domestic appliances, metalworking, machine tools, and other heavy manufacturing concerns. It also sponsors its own university, cooperative bank (Caja Laboral,) cooperative supermarket chain, and social security system. It is the seventh largest business group in Spain and the world's largest industrial cooperative. In its Basque setting, MC has succeeded in wedding capital to place and community. However, over the past two decades, the cooperative group has globalized its operations and investments and modified its structure to reflect its global reach. Either partly or wholly owned by MC, most of its new acquisitions are not worker-owned, rather they are standard corporations whose employees work for a wage. This development troubles many in the activist and academic communities who look to Mondragón for a socially just business model. Some lament that democracy and member well-being in the Basque country is now built upon the exploitation of workers in the third world. Others express concern about internal democracy and working conditions in the Basque co-op factories themselves. While every member, regardless of job or position, has one vote in the cooperative general assembly, the governing body that ratifies major business decisions, on the shop floor and in the course of more routine decision-making, worker participation and democracy

are less robust. Critics contend that workers do not have control over their working conditions and that they lack real power. Co-op workers, they argue, need a union.<sup>1</sup>

In April of this year, Hofstra Professor Sharryn Kasmir interviewed USW organizer Rob Witherell for *Regional Labor Review*. Rob has been with the Steelworkers since 1999, and he is currently spearheading the co-op project. Rob spoke from his office at USW headquarters in Pittsburgh. He explained that the USW-Mondragón agreement is an important step in addressing concerns about the integrity of the Mondragón Corporation in a global business environment. The USW and MC expect to combine the worker ownership and democratic governance of the co-ops with collective bargaining, pioneering a hybrid union-co-op organization. In this interview, he talks about the union, the economic crisis, green jobs, and the historic USW-Mondragón agreement.

**Sharryn Kasmir: Tell me about what's happening these days with the USW. How many members do you have now?**

**Rob Witherell:** Between the U.S. and Canada, we have 1.2 million active and retired members, about 800,000 active. We merged with PACE (Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy International Union) in 2005, and with that merger we got a whole bunch of members in paper, oil, chemical. We already had members in steel, aluminum, tire, glass and some health care and public sector. So we're a fairly diversified industrial union.

**SK: We read a lot about how the recession is affecting the UAW. How is it impacting your members?**

**RW:** If you think about all the industry segments I just mentioned, in terms of steel, aluminum, tire, glass, oil, these are all things that are related to the two major industries that have really been hurt-- autos and housing. So, our members have been directly impacted as much as the UAW has. You know, for any car that you buy, if it's made in the U.S., our members are probably manufacturing the steel for that car, the aluminum parts, the tires, windshields. When that demand is cut in half, production by our employers gets cut in half too.



**SK: So your members are losing jobs and experiencing lay offs. Is this part of the reason the USW became interested in developing worker cooperatives?**

**RW:** Yes. The USW has been active in employee ownership going back probably twenty years. In late '80s, early '90s, we did a lot of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs.) Mainly, it was a way for our members to invest in their employers, to help them through the downturn of the early '90s. Now, some of that has held fast; there are some small examples where we still have ESOPs, where they're still 100% owned. But most of the ESOP activity from twenty years ago has since been sold out or closed or disappeared.

And, certainly there has been an interest in co-ops within the union. One of our former international presidents, Lynn Williams, is from Canada, and certainly the folks in Canada have a lot more experience and exposure to the cooperative concept, and he has been interested in figuring out ways that we could work more closely together again. There are other folks for example, Steve Hunt, who is our Director for District 3 in the western provinces of Canada, he serves on the Executive Board of the Western Labor Worker Co-op Committee. So there's a lot of interest in co-ops throughout the union.

**SK: How did the USW begin to think about partnering with the Mondragón Cooperatives?**

**RW:** We became interested in Mondragón when I worked with Michael Peck, the North American delegate for Mondragón. He also does the external relations for a company called Gamesa, which is a wind turbine manufacture in Pennsylvania that is headquartered in the Basque region, in Bilbao. He and I got to know each other working on Gamesa stuff. They have two manufacturing plants in Pennsylvania, which we organized in 2006.

We have had a pretty good relationship with Gamesa over the last few years since we organized the plants. At Gamesa's request, I was in Bilbao in 2008 to speak at an economic development meeting, where the Basque regional economic development agency and Gamesa were encouraging Gamesa's suppliers to expand into the

U.S. and to locate their operations alongside Gamesa here in Pennsylvania. That way Gamesa would have quicker access to its suppliers. They asked me to come and talk about the union and the potential for wind energy in the U.S. and to help encourage folks to come over.

While I was in Bilbao, Michael gave me a call and said, "Hey, while you're there, you should go talk with somebody at Mondragón. I think you have a lot in common." So I took a long cab ride from Bilbao to Mondragón and met with the President of Mondragón International. And we had a pretty interesting conversation, and we found that we have a lot in common, and that led to more conversations over the next year with other folks here, including Leo W. Gerard, and the more conversations we had, the more we thought, "Well, we should do something together, work together here in the U.S."

Part of what we discussed was, well, we can work behind closed doors and try to find the ideal project for us to work on, and then we can announce it when it's all done. But we didn't want to do that. Instead, we announced that we are going to work together because we think it's a pretty important concept to get out there, and then we'll go from there and see what opportunities present themselves. We will use the announcement as a starting point rather than an ending point.

**SK: In the agreement signed in October of 2009, both parties talk about building a next-generation hybrid co-op-union. What might that look like?**

**RW:** In the Mondragón co-ops, they have one worker, one vote, and they have a general assembly that elects the board of directors. And the directors appoint some managers. But, one thing that they have to make sure is that workers have appropriate representatives. So they establish social councils, and through the social council, members are represented for each department or whatever the break down is within the co-op so that they are a representative group. Within the co-ops, to some extent these social councils act almost like a union. They advise management on issues of wages, benefits, that kind of stuff. But it's only an advisory role. Our expectation for the U.S. and Canada is, if we took that model and implemented it here, that the union's bargaining committee would serve in the role of the social council. The union's bargaining committee would actually bargain an agreement.

If you look at what the co-op model is, it means that everybody is supposed to be equal. But, a standard practice is unquestioned, that the co-op should be able to elect a board of directors who may appoint management. So, essentially the workers elect a board to be advocates for the business. And that's not questioned. Why not let the workers also elect people to be advocates for the workers? But that doesn't mean that you're going to have non-stop conflict. It just means that you really need to have different perspectives and interests even within the co-op, and it would serve a co-op better

and the workers better if you had those different interests represented and figured out a way to balance them.

**SK: Do you have any plans for a business, or are you looking at any worker buyouts or investment opportunities?**

**RW:** There are a handful of projects that we've looked at to feel our way forward, to serve as examples. Okay, what would we need for these types of projects? Whether those specific projects go forward I'm not sure at this point, but it has been definitely helpful in terms of thinking about resources. Because the point is not just to have a co-op, but to have a co-op that could be affiliated with Mondragón that will benefit from that affiliation in terms of being better positioned for growth.

**SK: What sort of an investment arrangement do you envision with MC or the cooperative bank Caja Laboral?**

**RW:** I think initially MC has certainly had their share of acquisitions, and those have not necessarily gone well.

**SK: None of them are cooperatives, right? They're all standard firms?**

**RW:** Well, I don't know if all them are, but almost all of them are not cooperatives. And, yeah, it really is an acquisition of the business but nothing more than that. So there are internal discussions in Mondragón about what can we do about that, because people who have been in this Mondragón culture a long time see this as a problem, because they want everybody to be owners. But pragmatically it's difficult in terms of the distance between the co-ops and the different cultures, and how do you make that work? So they passed a resolution, three years ago or so at their annual cooperative congress, where they said that they weren't going to go outside Spain unless they found a partner that they could work with and bring their model with them, that it was important for them to implement as much of their model as they possibly could. But they also recognize that with cultural issues and whatnot it would be some type of hybrid of the model. So that was the starting point.

**SK: Would your business be formed the same way as any new Mondragón co-op, that is, would it be financed by the cooperative bank, be a member of MC, and would the workers contribute to the a capital account to fund their ownership share? Is that how you envision things?**

**RW:** Well, the examples that they've used have been in Spain. Say, a family-owned business, and the owner wants to sell the company to the workers. Usually the workers can't afford to buy it. Even

when they are able to come up with the money for the ownership buy-in, that amount is not enough to cover the whole business. Maybe figure it's like \$20,000 apiece. If you have 50 workers, that would get you a million bucks, but that's usually not enough to buy a business.

So they have financing from Caja Laboral, and they have looked for investments from existing co-ops within the Mondragón Corporation. And they have pieced it together, with those as the three main pieces. And I think that is something that we would probably be looking at here in the U.S., piecing together a whole bunch of different sources. So whether that means concessions from workers to finance their ownership, or loans for workers to finance their ownership, plus maybe minority investors. You know, it's going to be a bunch of different pieces to put it all together.

**SK: What do you think about some of the criticism of the cooperatives? The idea that they're investing in firms outside of Spain or in third-world countries from which they're deriving profits but where they don't have members. Or that they're non-union in their home environment, or that they rely heavily on temporary workers to stabilize a core group of worker-owners? From the perspective of a union person, what do you think of those sorts of criticisms?**

**RW:** To be honest, I would say there are folks in the Steelworkers who were concerned, definitely, that Mondragón does not have a union in its home base, and what that means. That is certainly a concern. But we also have some ties with the unions in Spain, and our overall impression has been, there hasn't necessarily been a history of conflict, the unions and co-ops tend to be natural allies, not naturally in conflict.

**SK: And what about temporary workers?**

**RW:** Certainly, as a union, temporary workers are something that concerns us, but I think if you look at any of our employers, there aren't a whole lot of employers that don't use temporary workers to some extent. And we bargain ways to keep that under wraps in our contract, because sometimes there are ups and downs seasonally in the business. You know, it could be that. It could be specific projects. So, it's a concern, but it's not something that's completely unknown to us, we deal with that on an everyday basis.

**SK: I recall reading that since the agreement was signed, you've gotten calls and e-mails every day from people asking for your help. Tell me about some of those communications.**

**RW:** I got an e-mail from a UAW member in Minneapolis saying the board is scheduled to close their plant next year. Is there anything that can be done? I got a call from somebody who's

unemployed in North Dakota who is interested in doing cooperative stuff and was willing to volunteer to do whatever he could, but ultimately was looking for work. I got a call from somebody who had an invention that they were willing to lease out, but they wanted to do it with a group that was going to do it as a cooperative.

**SK: Have you heard from any unions?**

**RW:** No, I wish, but I haven't.

**SK: The USW has been making efforts to move into green jobs, and you have helped to found the Blue-Green Alliance. Could you say something about those efforts?**

**RW:** The Blue-Green Alliance was the culmination of a couple decades of work that our union had been doing with folks from the environmental side, and going back to reports we wrote in 1969, predating the Clean Air Act. We were talking about clean air and global warming back then. Our issue has always been, of course, that our industries are dirty industries, but our workers tend to live in those communities and are directly impacted by that.

And in 1990, the union issued a report called "Our Children's World." The introduction was something along the lines of... We used to think that smoke meant jobs, and if that meant the air was dirty and the lake was polluted, well, that just meant you lived somewhere else or went somewhere else for the weekend or for a holiday, to get away and do that stuff away from where it was polluted. But, pollution was the price of economic progress. And we said that we realize that we can't just have one or the other. You have to have a clean environment and good jobs. You're either going to have both or you're going to have neither.

And we've worked on a number of those issues, and we worked with the Sierra Club informally on a number of issues, and so we came out and made the relationship formal, with the founding of our Blue-Green Alliance in 2006, which also coincided with a followup to the 1990 report. The 2006 report was called "Securing Our Children's World."

**SK: The Blue-Green Alliance is between you and the Sierra Club?**

**RW:** It was initially between the United Steel Workers and the Sierra Club. Since 2006, when it was founded, the National Resources Defense Council joined from the green side, and a whole bunch of other unions have joined in from the labor movement, SEIU, Laborers, CWA, Teamsters... If you add up the green NGOs and the labor unions, I think we came up with over seven million members of the participating organizations. They did their first "Good Jobs, Green Jobs" conference here in Pittsburgh two years ago. They expected 500 people to show up, and 900 did. And then they did one in D.C. last year. They expected 2,000



people to show up and 3,000 did. And this year they're expecting about 4,000 people.

**SK: What would you like to see the Obama Administration do to support green jobs and to support cooperatives?**

**RW:** On green jobs, the biggest issue we're dealing with right now is domestic content. And going back to you can't have a green environment without good jobs, and you can't have good jobs without a green environment, using wind as an example, the American Wind Energy Association has been advocating for a renewable energy standard, but they haven't been able to get enough support to get that passed in Congress. Part of the reason that they don't have the support right now is because there's nothing that ties it to creating any jobs in the U.S. With 10% unemployment, jobs are the number-one issue that people are facing right now.

If we had a renewable energy standard with a domestic content requirement, it would do both. It would create manufacturing jobs that are going to be better-than-average jobs here in the U.S. It's also going to put the turbines up and reduce our dependence on fossil fuels and hopefully meet our energy needs without depending on foreign oil, too.

I'll give you a specific example of how that worked positively. Gamesa, as I mentioned, has two plants in Pennsylvania. One makes the nacelles--the rectangular housing at the top of the tower that house the generator and the gears. All that stuff is up there. That's where the spinning of the blades actually creates the electricity. They assemble that out in Fairless Hills. And then they make the blades for the wind turbines in Ebensburg. Well, right before Thanksgiving last year they had to lay off about half of the plant in Ebensburg because they didn't have the orders they thought they were going to. Generally, to build a wind farm, the developer

puts a lot of cash up front, with a long lead-time for all the permits and acquisition, so it's a fairly big financial risk if you don't have guarantees that you're going to have a buyer for the electricity. What happened was the developers couldn't get loans anymore because of the financial crisis, and so the developers, even if they had put money down and committed to buy the turbines years ahead of time, they couldn't make those purchases. With sales agreements terminated and deliveries cancelled, Gamesa no longer had the customers they had planned on, so they had to cut production and ultimately a bunch of people got laid off.

So back in February, Governor Rendell awarded the \$22 million the state had from the Stimulus Act for renewable energy. He awarded that for three wind farms in Pennsylvania. But to qualify for that money, the wind farms using local content were given preference. The three developers that got the money all committed to use locally produced Gamesa turbines. So that meant that these guys at Gamesa all went back to work.

**SK: You want to see something like that at a federal level?**

**RW:** Exactly.

**SK: And what do you think the Obama Administration could do to support cooperatives?**

**RW:** That's a big question, because if you think about how the biggest cooperatives in the country were formed, the biggest cooperatives are the rural electric cooperatives. Those were formed by Roosevelt in the '30s. And that was a pretty big act of government there to create those. These were not things that just kind of grew by themselves; to go that big, you're going to need some type of assistance.

On a smaller scale, I know that Senator Bernie Sanders with Sherrod Brown, Pat Leahy, and Robert Menendez have co-sponsored legislation in the Senate to create an ownership bank and to create employee ownership centers in each state (S.2914 - United States Employee Ownership Bank Act.) But the ownership bank is supposed to have \$500 billion, I think, to lend to businesses that are doing employee ownership. So, in terms of what we're trying to do with Mondragón, the idea's there, the business model is out there, but I think the biggest hurdle we're going to face is going to be financing. And so if there was a publically funded mechanism to help with the financing, I think that would be a great investment of our tax dollars.

**SK: You'd like to see an ownership bank plus other kinds of incentives?**

**RW:** Right. In Canada, cooperatives have tax advantages that we don't have in the U.S. The other thing that is really intriguing to me

in Canada is that they have labor-sponsored investment plans. In Quebec, the largest such plan is the Solidarity Fund, in which anybody can invest up to \$5,000 each year.

**SK: Is it like a 401(k), but labor-sponsored and directed towards select industries or businesses?**

**RW:** Right. But it's better than that, because upon putting it in you get a 15% tax credit from the province, and you get a 15% tax credit from the national government. And then eventually you get your interest on the investments, as well. And the Solidarity Fund has, I think, averaged about a 7% annual return. The Solidarity Fund chooses what to invest in. They do the standard stuff like any investor, but they also do a social audit. They make sure that if you're coming to them for investment funds, they do an audit of all your practices to make sure that you're not anti-union, you're not a polluter, that you're making community-friendly investments.

**SK: That's interesting, because we have social choice funds in the US ...**

**RW:** Right, right, but then there's no solid framework on how that gets invested. So even if you think of the big pension funds, like CalPERS (California Public Employees Retirement System,) there's no framework for them that says that they're going to invest in stuff that makes sure that there are jobs in California to support public workers. Which would make sense, because it's the state retirement fund.

**SK: Instead it's Wal-Mart, because they decided to go green.**

**RW:** Right, right. One of our allies in all this is Tom Croft, Executive Director of the Steel Valley Authority here in Pennsylvania. And he's been interested in figuring out how to make this work for a while. He came out with a book last year called *Up From Wall Street*, which identified friendly investment funds and he's trying to raise the question of how to ensure that our workers' pension funds are used for the benefit of workers, not for Wal-Mart investments.

**SK: In a paper you wrote, you said that you didn't want to see business as usual in the labor movement, you want to see the labor movement change and move forward. What are your thoughts about that? What do you hope to see in the next decades?**

**RW:** We're seeing too many years of losing members, of workers not having enough power to make gains. When the financial crisis first hit, the USW did a lot of education with our members, and there was a presentation that talked about how has this really affected us. You go back and chart real wages in terms of adjusting for cost of living and you chart productivity, you see that



productivity and wages of workers went up pretty much hand in hand until the 1970s. And then productivity kept going up, up, up, and workers' wages stagnated, because as a whole, workers just don't have as much bargaining power as they used to.

So how do we regain that bargaining power? How do we bring the union to people who really want it but can't get it? Because joining the union is probably the hardest thing that people will ever do in their lives. You know, weeks of harassment and intimidation from their employer, from their coworkers if they try to join the union. And so, yeah, we're shrinking, but it's not for a lack of interest on the part of working people. So how do we turn all that around?

I'd like to see us think about ways that we can be more pro-active. Can we create our own jobs? Can we grow? What do we do to help our employers grow who are friendly to us? And how do we sustain those jobs?

**SK: And do you see cooperatives as part of this picture?**

**RW:** We're still in the very early steps of trying to figure that out, but we're trying to create something that has a potential to be a real alternative. And the more success we have in doing that, the more viable it becomes for other folks. The idea of why we're doing the cooperatives is because, we've seen plant after plant be boxed up and shipped offshore, and workers laid off and stock prices go up and unemployment increase. We've got to figure out a way to create jobs that are sustainable and that are accountable to the workers and the communities, not just to the invisible shareholders.

**SK: Right. Is there anything you would like to add?**

**RW:** The one thing that I would add is that Leo just taped an interview with the Tavis Smiley Show on NPR where he talks about bringing some people from Mondragón's cooperative development group, LKS, here to Pittsburgh to help us move this forward. So that's the next step in terms of being on the ground, looking at the nuts and bolts.

**SK: That's interesting. Twenty years ago you wouldn't have imagined capital flow going in this direction, from what was a small cooperative business group to the world industrial center...**

**RW:** Right.

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1. For a focus on these concerns, see Sharryn Kasmir, *The Myth of Mondragon*, SUNY Press, 1996. For an introduction to structure and history of Mondragon see William Foote Whyte and Kathleen King Whyte. *Making Mondragon: The Growth and Dynamics of the Worker Cooperative Complex*. ILR Press, 1988. For discussion of the corporate business structure in the context of the emerging global market see George Cheney, *Values at Work: Employee Participation Meets Market Pressure at Mondragon*. ILR Press, 2002.

# Immigration's Impacts on the Long Island Economy

by David Dyssegaard Kallick

Over the past two decades, immigration has grown rapidly on Long Island. As immigrants have become an increasingly visible presence in the labor force, frequently heated questions have been raised about where these immigrants fit in to the Long Island economy, and what have been their effects on U.S.-born workers.

National research leaves little doubt that, overall, immigration is strongly connected with economic growth. Immigrants are drawn to areas where there are jobs, and fuel further growth as they fill labor market demand, shop at local stores, and send their kids to school. Immigrants are entrepreneurs in disproportionate numbers, opening restaurants, starting small stores, providing services – often in areas with previously empty storefronts. On Long Island, immigrants have brought vitality back to commercial strips in a range of communities across Nassau and Suffolk counties: Indians in Hicksville, Latinos in Patchogue, Iranians in Great Neck.

But, even if immigrants are connected with local economic growth, the question remains: What happens to U.S.-born workers as immigrants enter the economy? Do they share in a growing economic pie, or do they lose jobs as immigrants gain them? Do wages for U.S.-born workers go up or down? And, when wages change, is it because of immigration or is it due to other factors?


In this report, we take a clear-eyed look at the effects of immigration on Long Island, both positive and negative. We look at immigration at three economic peaks: 1990, 2000 and 2007. The decennial census data for 1990 and 2000 correspond almost exactly to the economic peaks, giving us a rich data source. For the 2007 peak, we use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) that combines 2005, 2006, and 2007 (referred to in the text as 2005/07). Although the recession hit Long Island later than the rest of the United States, we can see Long Island unemployment dipping in the 2008 ACS, so 2005/07 gives a better picture of the peak than would be the case for the combined years 2006/08, while giving a bigger sample size than would be available from the single year of 2007.

These three data points allow us to make comparisons of how workers fared at comparable points in the economic cycle. A business cycle peak is when unemployment rates are expected to be at their lowest and employment at its highest. The 1990 to 2005/07 time frame shows a time when immigrant share of

the labor force increased from 12 to 21 percent. It also shows a period in which the number of undocumented immigrants was growing significantly – more than doubling in number statewide, according to estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center. By looking at how U.S.-born workers are faring, we would be able to see whether immigration, either documented or undocumented, was having a substantial negative impact. It is in particular worth noting that we do not need to determine the detailed characteristics of undocumented immigrants to see whether illegal immigration is having a negative impact, since that impact would be measured in the outcomes for U.S.-born workers at the most recent peak compared to the same group (say, U.S.-born white men with a high school degree) at the previous economic peak.

Our conclusion is that, while there are some problems that deserve consideration, the Long Island economy has generally absorbed immigrants at the levels at which they have come in recent years with positive benefits to the overall economy and with few negative effects on U.S.-born workers. The areas of concern center on the shrinking number of U.S.-born men who did not attend college.

Figure 1  
Long Island population & Immigrants' Share (%), 1900-2009



Black men with high school or less saw higher unemployment at a time when immigration increased, and both black and white men at the bottom of the economic ladder saw stagnating or eroding wages. Many factors are at play in creating these changes, but immigration is likely at least a part of the story.

Keeping negative impacts in perspective, addressing the real concerns, and bearing in mind the overall benefits and reality of immigration would seem like solid cornerstones of future policy for Long Island and for the country.

## A BRIEF HISTORY

Long Island has a long history of immigration, though the recent increase may make it feel like a new issue to the current generation of Long Island residents. In the early part of the 20th century, the population of Long Island was far smaller than it is today, but the share of the population that was born in another country was considerably higher. Through the first four decades of the century, roughly one in five Long Island residents was an immigrant

In the U.S. as a whole, immigrants' share of the population was about 14 percent in the early part of the 20th century. Immigration dropped steeply due to restrictionist laws in the 1920s and was held down by the Depression and World War II in the 1930s and '40s. Consequently, the immigrant share of the U.S. population reached a low of five percent in 1970. In 2005/07, immigrants made up 12 percent of total U.S. population.

The shape of the curve of immigrant share of population on Long Island is similar to that of the country as a whole. The picture on Long Island, however, is shaded by the tremendous growth in the overall population. The total number of residents on Long Island grew at a rapid clip from 1910 to about 1950, then increased explosively during the 1950s and '60s. This was a time of suburbanization and "white flight" from the cities around the country, with Long Island at the forefront and Levittown an often-invoked symbol of the trend.

Although it was not very visible at the time, the number of immigrants on Long Island continued to grow throughout the '50s and '60s. What made this trend hard to see was that at the same time the immigrant share of the population dropped rapidly. A small increase in the number of immigrants was swamped by an extraordinary increase in the U.S.-born population. From 1950 to 1970, the immigrant population grew by about 70,000 – from 126,000 to 193,000 – while the U.S.-born population grew by one and a half million. The immigrant population of Long Island at that point included many Italian, Irish, and Jewish immigrants who had settled first in New York City and then followed U.S.-born residents to suburbs that were overwhelmingly white. Blacks and Puerto Ricans mostly remained in New York City, or in racially and ethnically separated communities on Long Island.

Since 1970, the U.S.-born population has remained at about the same level, between 2.3 and 2.4 million. During the period of our study, from 1990 to 2005/07, we can see that the total population increased slightly, by 158,000. The U.S.-born population didn't change much, but the foreign-born population increased significantly. Although the overall U.S.-born population holds relatively flat, declining by just 13,000 from 1990 to 2005/07, the number of working-age U.S.-born adults has decreased by 94,000, driven by an even greater drop in the number of young adults 20-34 years old. This declining number of U.S.-born working-age adults was offset by a gain of 139,000 working-age immigrants, resulting in a modest net growth of 44,000 in the overall working age population over nearly two decades.

Table 1  
Top Counties of Birth for Immigrants on  
Long Island, 2005-2007

Country of birth	Frequency	Share of all immigrants
El Salvador	56,761	13%
India	29,746	7%
Italy	24,597	5%
Dominican Republic	21,540	5%
Jamaica	20,965	5%
Haiti	18,002	4%
Ecuador	13,721	3%
Philippines	13,410	3%
Colombia	12,920	3%
Korea	12,200	3%
Honduras	10,632	2%
Poland	10,480	2%
China	10,414	2%
Guatemala	10,289	2%
Pakistan	9,712	2%
Peru	9,098	2%
Germany	9,091	2%
Mexico	8,502	2%
Trinidad and Tobago	7,599	2%
Iran	7,294	2%
Other	132,039	29%
All immigrants	449,012	100%

Source: FPI analysis of 2005-07 ACS.

The overall level of the Long Island labor force remained relatively flat between 1990 and 2005/07 at about 1.4 million. But the composition changed, with a reduction in the number of U.S.-born workers of 110,000 offset by an increase in foreign-born workers of 123,000. In 2005/07, the 449,000 immigrants on Long Island made up 16 percent of the overall population, a bigger number of immigrants than ever before on the island, and an immigrant share of total population about halfway between the high level of 21 to 23 percent in 1910 to 1930 and the low level of eight to nine percent in 1960 and 1970.

### **Changing racial and ethnic mix**

As immigrants have come to Long Island over the past two decades, they have increased the racial and ethnic diversity of the area. But, immigration was hardly the only factor in the changing ethnic mix on Long Island: the recent period of immigration has coincided with a broader diversification. The share of the Long Island population that is white decreased from 84 percent in 1990 to 72 percent in 2005/07. About half of the growth in non-white population has been due to immigration, and about half to people who were born in the United States. The U.S.-born share includes people who move to Long Island from New York City, people who come from other states, people who come from Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories, and children born in this country to immigrant parents. In 2005/07, whites comprised about three quarters of Long Island residents, Latinos 13 percent, blacks nine percent, and Asians five percent. Most Long Island residents in all racial/ethnic categories were born in the United States. Even among Long Island Latinos, slightly more than half (54 percent) were born in the United States.

In addition, immigrants on Long Island are themselves strikingly diverse. No single country of origin predominates. The largest share, 13 percent, come from El Salvador, followed by 7 percent from India, and 5 percent each from Italy (probably mostly an earlier generation of immigrants), the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica (Table 1). Mexicans, such a big part of immigration to the United States as a whole and an even bigger part of the national media coverage, make up just 2 percent of immigrants on Long Island.

### **Undocumented immigrants as part of recent immigration**

There was a substantial increase in the number of undocumented immigrants on Long Island between 1990 and 2005/07, although it is of course difficult to get an exact count. According to the best available estimate, from the Pew Hispanic Center, the total number of undocumented immigrants in New York State grew from about 350,000 in 1990 to about 925,000 in 2008. In an estimate made for the Fiscal Policy Institute's Working for a Better Life, the Pew Hispanic Center concluded that as of the mid 2000s, roughly one in six immigrants in New York's major downstate suburbs (Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester) is undocumented – about the same share as in the state as a whole. It is worth noting that the share of immigrants that are undocumented in New York is well below the national average of about one in three.

Economists generally believe that the most important effect of immigration on U.S.-born workers is how many people enter the labor market and what skills they have. But legal status also matters: undocumented workers are more likely to be particularly taken advantage of by employers since it is more difficult for them to stand up for their rights. The findings noted in this report are the net effect of both documented and undocumented immigration. Where possible we consider the potentially different impacts of legal and illegal immigrants.

### **The current economic downturn**

This report focuses on the long-term effects of immigration, and looks at unemployment rates and other factors at the same point of the business cycle. This allows us to factor out recession and expansion periods. Comparing at different points of the business cycle, we would expect unemployment rates for all workers would be lower in good economic times and higher in bad times. Comparing at the high point in the cycle allows us to see whether rates for particular groups have changed relative to where they were at the previous peak.

As Long Island, like the country as a whole, struggles to make its way out of the current economic downturn, a natural question is: what has happened since the 2005/07 peak? As of this writing, job loss on Long Island seems to have bottomed out, and is starting to slowly recover. Unemployment has indeed increased significantly on Long Island, though the overall 2009 unemployment rate of 7.1 percent was well below the national average of 9.3 percent. (2009 is the most recent year for which data is available at this level of detail, and it seems to be the low-point for unemployment on Long Island.). Throughout this period, unemployment rates for immigrants were similar to those of U.S.-born workers – slightly lower in 2006 and 2007, slightly higher in 2008 and 2009, with the overall change driven by high unemployment rates for foreign-born women.

In the analysis that follows, we will see that unemployment rates for U.S.-born workers generally return at each economic peak to the same level as the previous peak. The exception, as we will see, is for U.S.-born black men with lower educational levels. In looking at Long Island unemployment rates in the recession, U.S.-born black men also stand out as having consistently high unemployment rates. The unemployment rate for black men is double the rate for white men in 2009—though it was also double in the near-peak year of 2006.

One reason immigration does not have a more pronounced effect on U.S.-born workers is that immigration is highly responsive to economic conditions. Immigration tends to increase when there are jobs available and to slow down when there are not. This seems to be happening on Long Island in the current recession. Immigration had been growing for years, but by 2009 immigrants still accounted for the same 16 percent of the population as in 2006.

Table 2  
Immigrant Share of Long Island GDP, 1990-2007

			Change, 1990 to 2005/07	
	1990	2005/07	absolute	%
Immigrant Share of Long Island Population	11.0%	16.0%	—	—
Immigrant Share of Long Island Labor Force	12.0%	21.0%	—	—
Long Island's Total Economic Output (in billions of 2000 dollars)	\$110.8	\$150.9	\$40.1	36.0%
Long Island Immigrants' Economic Output (in billions of 2000 dollars)	\$12.9	\$26.6	\$13.7	107.0%
Immigrant Share of LI Economic Output,	12.0%	18.0%	—	—

**Table 2 sources:** FPI analysis of U.S. Census, ACS and BEA data. Note: LI resident economic output is estimated by applying LI residents share of total NY State employment income to GDP. Immigrant share of output estimated similarly. Above results are inflation-adjusted to \$2000. In \$2007, LI total output is \$171 b., of which the immigrant share is \$30 b

### Immigrants' broad contributions

Immigrants are making an important contribution to Long Island, and are clearly “pulling their weight” in the economy. Between 1990 and 2005/07, estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of Long Island residents grew by 36 percent. During that time, the immigrant share of GDP increased from 12 to 18 percent – meaning that immigrants accounted for about \$27 billion of the \$151 billion economic output of Long Island (in year 2000 dollars). Largely due to their rising share of the labor force, immigrants’ growing output represents just over one-third of total GDP growth in this period (Table 2).

The economic contribution of immigrants throughout the United States is generally proportionate to their share of the population. In a 2009 report, “Immigrants on Long Island,” the Fiscal Policy Institute used the total of wage and salary earnings plus proprietor’s earnings as a gauge of total economic output (as the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis does when it measures metro area Gross Domestic Product), and developed an “Immigrant Economic Contribution Ratio.” An Immigrant Economic Contribution Ratio of 1.00 means immigrants’ economic output is exactly in line with their share of the population, and a ratio above 1.00 means immigrant share of economic output is greater than immigrant share of population.

In 2005-07, immigrants made up 16 percent of Long Island residents, and accounted for 18 percent of local economic output. This gave Long Island an Immigrant Economic Contribution Ratio of 1.10—greater than the majority of the 25 largest metropolitan areas around the country, including the New York metro area of which it is a part, and almost exactly the same as the ratio (1.12) of the country as a whole (Table 3).

Immigrants generally have lower earnings than U.S.-born workers, and the same is true on Long Island. There are three basic reasons immigrant economic output is higher than might be expected.

Immigrants are more likely to be in the prime working age (16- to 64-years old), so their share of the labor force is larger than their share of population. Immigrants on Long Island make up 20 percent of the working age population, and 21 percent of the labor force.

Immigrants are entrepreneurs: their share of proprietors’ earnings (20 percent) is about the same as their share of the labor force, even though their share of wage and salary earnings is slightly lower (18 percent). And, contrary to common misperception, immigrants are by no means all low-wage workers. On Long Island, the majority (53 percent) of immigrants work in white-collar jobs, either in managerial and professional specialty jobs; or in technical, sales,

Table 3  
Immigrant Economic Contribution Ratio on Long Island is  
Stronger than in Most Big Metro Areas

	Foreignborn share of population	Foreign-born share of economic output	Immigrant Economic Contribution Ratio
<b>New York City metro area and Long Island</b>			
New York City metro area	28%	28%	1.00
Long Island	16%	18%	1.10
<b>The 24 next largest metro areas, after New York City</b>			
Los Angeles 35% 34%	21,540	5%	1.00
Chicago	18%	18%	1.02
Dallas	18%	16%	0.91
Philadelphia	9%	10%	1.11
Houston	21%	21%	0.99
Miami	37%	38%	1.03
Washington	20%	20%	0.98
Atlanta	13%	13%	1.03
Detroit	9%	11%	1.30
Boston	16%	16%	0.99
San Francisco	30%	29%	0.98
Phoenix	17%	15%	0.89
Riverside	22%	25%	1.15
Seattle	15%	16%	1.02
Minneapolis	9%	8%	0.88
San Diego	23%	23%	0.98
St. Louis	4%	5%	1.22
Tampa	12%	13%	1.08
Baltimore	8%	9%	1.24
Denver	13%	10%	0.82
Pittsburgh	3%	4%	1.47
Portland	12%	12%	0.98
Cincinnati	3%	5%	1.39
Cleveland	6%	7%	1.26
<b>25 metro areas combined</b>	20%	20%	1.02
<b>United States</b>	12%	14%	1.12

**Table 3 source:** FPI analysis of 2005-07 ACS. Note: New York City metro area includes Long Island.

and administrative support jobs. By contrast, 44 percent work in either service or blue-collar jobs. Three percent in farming, fishing, and forestry on Long Island, these are significantly landscaping as well as farm-labor jobs (Figure 2).

Contrary to the common media portrayal of Latinos as working nearly exclusively in day labor and other low-wage jobs, our research has shown that day laborers make up less than one percent of all immigrant workers in New York’s downstate suburbs, and are a small share even of undocumented workers. While Latino immigrants on Long Island are less likely than other immigrants to hold high-wage occupations, a substantial number, 30 percent, do work in white-collar jobs (Figure 3).

There is undoubtedly some undercount of undocumented immigrants, who are concentrated in service, blue-collar, landscaping, and farming jobs. Jeff Passel of the Pew Hispanic Center estimates the undercount to be generally on the order of 10 to 15 percent, so even factoring in an undercount these ratios would not change substantially.

**Immigrant share of detailed occupations**

Immigrants make up 21 percent of the labor force (the grey shaded area in Figure 4). The colored bars show the immigrant share of a series of detailed occupational categories. Bars that go beyond the grey area represent occupations where immigrants are overrepresented, and those that are within the grey are those where immigrants are underrepresented. All jobs are included in the occupations here, so if all bars came to exactly 21 percent, it would mean immigrants were perfectly evenly spread among the full range of occupations on Long Island.

Scanning the chart, we see that immigrants are overrepresented in many blue-collar and service jobs (except among firefighters, police, and supervisors of protective services), but they are not far from parity in most white-collar occupations, and they are in fact overrepresented among professionals.

In white-collar jobs (the first group of bars on the chart), immigrants make up 16 percent of executive, administrative and managerial workers, 22 percent of people in professional specialties, and 26 percent of registered nurses, pharmacists, and health therapists. In technical, sales, and administrative support (the second group of bars), immigrants make up 20 percent of Long Island technicians, 19 percent of people in higher-paid sales jobs, 17 percent of those in lower-paid sales jobs, and 14 percent of those in administrative support jobs, including as secretaries.

In blue-collar and lower-wage service jobs (the third and fourth group of bars), immigrants play a disproportionately big role in nearly every occupation with the exception of uniformed officers,




Figure 2 source: FPI analysis of ACS.




Figure 3 source: FPI analysis of ACS.

where they are significantly underrepresented. A few occupations are particularly striking. Immigrants make up 58 percent of all machine operators living on Long Island, 38 percent private households and personal service workers. Immigrants make up 25 percent of people working in the higher-paid construction trades, just slightly above their 21 percent share of the overall labor force,

but 37 percent of the lower-paid occupation that includes construction laborers and other materials handlers. Immigrants make up 41 percent of farming, fishing, and forestry jobs (the single black bar at bottom). On Long Island, a significant portion of these jobs are in landscaping and gardening.

Table 4  
Unemployment Rates of U.S.-born Labor Force  
on Long Island, by Sex, Race, Spanish Origin, 1990-2007

Long Island	1990	2000	2005-07	percentage point change
<b>U.S.-born women</b>	4.2%	3.3%	4.0%	-0.2%
White	3.8%	2.9%	3.7%	-0.1%
Black	7.3%	6.6%	5.5%	-1.8%
Hispanic/Latina	7.0%	5.1%	4.2%	-2.8%
<b>U.S.-born men</b>	3.9%	3.4%	4.2%	0.3%
White	3.5%	3.0%	3.6%	0.1%
Black	8.5%	8.2%	8.3%	-0.2%
Hispanic/Latina	6.7%	3.9%	7.4%	0.7%

**Source:** FPI analysis, using ACS and Census demographic data and adjusting to LAUS baseline unemployment figures.

**Note:** Sample of persons, 16 years and older. US-born Asian subsample too small to report rate. Business Cycle peaks (national): July 1990, March 2001, December 2007 (<http://www.nber.org/cycles.html>)

Table 5  
Unemployment Rates of US-born Long Island Men,  
Ages 25-64, by Race and Educational Attainment

	1990	2000	2005-07	percentage point change
<b>White men, US-born</b>				
Less than high school	7.6%	8.1%	6.0%	-1.6%
High school	3.7%	3.2%	3.3%	-0.3%
Some college	2.7%	2.0%	3.1%	0.5%
College degree or more	1.5%	1.4%	1.5%	0.1%
TOTAL, all educ. levels	2.7%	2.3%	2.5%	-0.2%
<b>Black men, US-born</b>				
High school or less	6.2%	8.2%	7.8%	1.6%
TOTAL, all educ. levels	5.5%	5.6%	4.5%	-1.0%

**Table Source:** FPI analysis of U.S. Census and ACS, adjusted to LAUS.

**Note:** High school and less than high school are combined for African Americans to give a statistically significant sample; sample is too small to break out other education levels for black men individually. Among whites, rate decline for non-HS grads is statistically insignificant.



### ***Immigrants seldom displace native workers***

Immigrants are playing an important role in occupations across the economic spectrum. But, as immigrants have entered the Long Island economy, are U.S.-born workers still able to find jobs?

By the most obvious measure, the unemployment rate, it would seem that U.S.-born residents of Long Island had about the same chance of finding a job at the economic peak of 2005/07 as they did when immigration was at a much lower level at the economic peak of 1990 (Table 4). For U.S.-born women, unemployment rates were not only stable during a period of significant immigration, but in fact they declined for some groups. At the top of the business cycle – in 1990, 2000, and 2005/07—unemployment rates for U.S.-born white women consistently returned to very low figures, from 3.8 percent in 1990 to an extraordinarily low 2.9 percent in 2000 and in 2005/07 back to 3.7 percent, almost the same as in 1990. White women are also the large majority of the female labor force. In 2005/07, there were a total of 358,000 U.S.-born white women in the civilian labor force, making up 85 percent of all U.S.-born women workers.

More impressively, the unemployment rates for U.S.-born black and Latina women shrank from one economic peak to the next, at a time when substantial numbers of immigrant were entering the economy. The rate for black women declined from 7.3 percent in 1990 to 5.5 percent in 2005/07. And for U.S.-born Latinas, the rate dropped from 7.0 percent to 4.2 percent, so that by 2005/07 the unemployment rate for U.S.-born Latinas is nearly the same as for U.S.-born white women. (Black and Latina women make up 7 and 5 percent, respectively, of U.S.-born women workers on Long Island.) For women, breaking this down by education level tells the same story: women (25 to 64 years old) have about the same or lower unemployment levels in 2005/07 than they did in 1990 at all education levels, and in all race/ethnic categories.

These results do not prove that the unemployment rates for U.S.-born Latinas and African American women came down because of immigration; there are numerous other factors in the Long Island economy. But, we can conclude that immigration did not stop these positive changes from taking place. It is also possible to envision some ways that immigration might help reduce unemployment for women: providing affordable child care, for example, serving as home health-care workers, or creating opportunities for women as supervisors of immigrant workers. It is worth noting that in-home child-care workers are particularly likely not only to be immigrants but also undocumented.

There are other questions that could raise concerns about the economic status of women. Are women closing the wage gap, for example, or are they being pushed to work more hours by deteriorating family earnings? The labor force participation rates were also changing somewhat during this time, increasing for U.S.-

born Latinas (from 60 to 63 percent), decreasing for African American women (from 65 to 61 percent), and staying about flat for U.S.-born white women (edging from 58 to 57 percent)—in all cases, for women 16 years and older. But, unemployment during this time was staying steady or declining for U.S.-born women suggest that immigration is compatible with U.S.-born women finding jobs.

For U.S.-born men, as the number of immigrants increased significantly, the overall unemployment levels generally stayed about the same. At the economic peak of 1990, the unemployment rate for U.S.-born men was not much different than at the peak in 2000 and the peak just before the current recession. This is true for U.S.-born white men, whose unemployment rates stayed between 3 and 4 percent in all three periods, and for U.S.-born black men, whose unemployment rates were about 8.5 percent at all three peaks, declining slightly over time. The U.S.-born labor force, like the U.S.-born population, continues to be predominantly white. In 2005/07, white men made up 87 percent of all U.S.-born men in the labor force on Long Island, black men 6 percent, and Latino men 5 percent.

Mirroring a national trend, as the labor force participation rate of U.S.-born women was going up, the rate for U.S.-born men was declining, from 77 percent in 1990 to 70 percent in 2005/07.

While the unemployment rates for black and white men are basically steady in all three economic peaks, it is certainly important to note that the unemployment rate for black men is consistently troublingly high. The fact that the unemployment rate for black men – on Long Island, as in other areas – is as high as 8.5 percent in economic peak years is a reason for serious concern.

Looking even further into the unemployment rates for U.S.-born black men, we can see that there are in fact gains by those with higher levels of formal education, but these gains are being offset by losses among those with lower levels of educational attainment. To examine what is happening with men at different educational levels, we narrow the age range to 25-64, workers in prime working age at a time when most people have finished their formal schooling.

The unemployment rate for U.S.-born black men in this age group overall shows some improvement, dropping from 5.5 percent at the 1990 peak to 4.5 percent in 2005/07 (Figure 5). But, for black men with high school or less, the unemployment rate increases from 6.2 percent to 8.2 percent in 2000 and then seems to level off and even decline a bit to 7.8 percent in 2005/07. The precise increase in the unemployment rate should be viewed with some caution. The sample size here is small—on Long Island, there were a total of 14,000 black men with high school or less in the labor force in 1990, and 11,000 in 2005/07 (out of a total labor force of 1.2 million in 2005/07). Although the findings are at the margin of

statistical significance, they are worth noting in particular since they are in line with national research on the topic.

What seems to be an increase in the unemployment rate for black men with lower levels of educational attainment is taking place at the same time as the number of immigrants is increasing significantly, and the number of undocumented immigrants is growing from very few in 1990 (because of the 1986 amnesty) to a substantial number in 2005/07. Other factors may also have an effect on the unemployment rates of black men during this time – such as the loss of manufacturing jobs and the high incarceration rates (and subsequent difficulty finding a job) for black men. But immigration does seem to be part of the story.


For U.S.-born white men, it is interesting to note that on Long Island the unemployment picture is positive at all educational levels. Although there would be reason to suspect that white men with less than high school would be in more direct competition with a bigger share of the immigrant population, and thus might be more likely to face unemployment, this does not seem to be the case on Long Island. Indeed, the only group of U.S.-born white men to see their unemployment levels actually go down over the course of the three peaks is those with less than high school. Although this decline may not be statistically significant, it is in any case not an increase. For U.S.-born white men with less than high school, the unemployment rate first rose between 1990 and 2000, from 7.6 to 8.1 percent, and then dropped to 6.0 percent by 2005/07 (Figure 6).

Immigration is a factor throughout both periods, so this outcome is not likely due to changes in immigration. More likely it is a result of the quickly shrinking number of white men with less than high school education—indeed, the 2005/07 number lacks strong statistical significance because the by that time there were a very small number of U.S.-born white men with less than a high school diploma on Long Island.

The unemployment rate for U.S-born Latino men dropped from 6.7 to 3.9 and then increased to 7.4. This may be in part a result of statistical variation because of modest sample size. But U.S.-born Latinos may also find themselves most directly affected by immigration, so it is perhaps not surprising that their unemployment rate is more volatile during a period of immigration.


While this report focuses on what happens to U.S.-born workers, it is interesting to note that the unemployment rates for foreign-born workers is also steady or declining over these three economic peaks, for both men and women and at virtually all educational levels and race/ethnic categories. This would suggest that the level of immigration has not been exceeding the Long Island economy’s capacity to absorb new workers. (See appendix in my full report for data.)

Figure 4  
Immigrant Shares of Detailed Occupations on Long Island




Source: FPI analysis of 2005-07 ACS.

Figure 5  
Unemployment Trends of Black US-born Non-college Men Deteriorate Relative to Comparable US-born White Men on Long Island



Source: FPI analysis of Census and ACS, adjusted to LAUS.

Figure 6  
**Unemployment Trends of White US-born Men on Long Island Show No Negative Impacts at Any Education Level, 1990 - 2007**



**Source:** FPI analysis of Census and ACS, adjusted to LAUS.

### Education Gains

Overall, the Long Island labor force is growing increasingly well educated, making significant gains since 1990. The above section concluded that African American men with lower levels of formal education are the one group that seems to be seeing increasing unemployment rates in the same period as immigration has been increasing.

At the same time, African American men on Long Island have been making significant educational strides. So, while African American men with lower levels of formal education had a harder time getting a job in 2005/07 than they did in 1990, the number of men in this group was also steadily shrinking. In 1990, the share of African American men in the labor force with less than a high school degree was 14 percent in 1990, double the rate for Long Island workers overall, and nearly triple the level for white men. In 2005/07 it was 6 percent, the same as the overall rate for workers on Long Island, although still triple the level for white men. Over this same period, the share of African American men in the labor force with at least some college increased from 45 percent in 1990 to 60 percent in 2005/07 (Table 6).

The trends for U.S.-born black men look considerably more positive on Long Island than in the country as a whole. Nationally, the share of U.S.-born black men in the labor force with less than high school dropped from 20 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2005/07. And the share with at least some college increased from 41 percent to 49 percent. Black men have increased their educational attainment in both the U.S. and on Long Island, but those on Long Island have made considerably bigger strides.

Clearly, improving the educational outcomes for African American men is an important way to help improve their employment outcomes. And, on Long Island in particular, there is improvement already underway that can be expanded. Addressing this issue is important for social, political and economic reasons, whether the apparently rising unemployment rate for African American men with lower educational levels is due to immigration or if it is simply taking place at that same time as the immigrant labor force is increasing.

Table 6  
**African American Men Making Significant Educational Progress**

US-Born black men living on Long Island	1990	2000	2005-07	percentage point change, 1990 to 2005-07
Less than high school	14%	8%	6%	-7%
High school	41%	39%	34%	-11%
Some college	31%	34%	34%	4%
College degree or more	14%	19%	26%	14%

**Source:** FPI analysis of Census and ACS. Universe: Persons 25 to 65 years old in the civilian labor force.

### Immigrants and gender employment trends

The *unemployment rate* measures people who are actively looking for work and cannot find it. Looking at the *employment ratio* gives an indication of whether U.S.-born workers might be getting “pushed out” of the labor market altogether. Where the unemployment rate shows the number of people who are actively looking for work but cannot find it, the employment ratio shows jobholders as a share of the total working-age population.

But, while the employment ratio shows how many people are jobholders, the balance – those not employed – make up a rather mixed group. In addition to people who are officially unemployed, this group includes people who have given up looking for a job, perhaps because they are crowded out of the labor market. But, the group also includes people with disabilities, early retirees, stay-at-home parents, full-time students, and others who are neither employed nor looking for a job. The employment ratio examined here is for men and women ages 25 to 64 – the age range, again, chosen because people have completed their education by age 25, and people 65 and older who are not working are likely to be retired.

The employment ratio for U.S.-born women 25-64 on Long Island went up for all race/ethnic groups between 1990 and 2005/07, as more women entered the labor force. Among U.S.-born white women – the large majority of the female labor force – the employment rate increased from 65 to 69 percent. For U.S.-born Latinas it increased most sharply, from 61 to 71 percent. And, for African American women it increased from 70 to 74 percent, dipping slightly along the way to 69 percent in 2000. U.S.-born Asian women saw an increase between 1990 and 2005/07 from 61 to 66 percent though their employment ratio was lower in 2005/07 than the high of 70 percent reached in 2000. Looking just at the level and not at the trend, it is interesting to see that African American women have the highest employment ratio, although U.S.-born white and Asian women match the level of African American women in 2000 (Table 7).

U.S.-born men ages 25-64 started with a considerably higher employment ratio than U.S.-born women, but the gap is narrowing, and in fact U.S.-born black men and women are now effectively at parity. The ratio for white men declined somewhat, from 88 to 84 percent, between 1990 and 2005/07, very much in line with the decline nationally of 3 percentage points. The employment ratio remained flat at 76 percent at for African American men, compared to a 4 percent decline for U.S.-born black men nationally. The rate for U.S.-born Latino men dropped more than the national average, from 86 to 82 percent on Long Island, compared to a 1 percentage point drop nationally. For U.S.-born Asian men on Long Island the rate has increased, from 79 to 85 percent, while nationally there was a 4 percentage point drop.

These changes in the employment ratio for men have been noticed by researchers for decades, and do not seem to bear a relationship to immigration, but seem more closely related to the increasing labor force participation of women.

Breaking the employment ratio down by educational level, U.S.-born white men see some declines in all educational groups. African American men see a decline in the employment ratio of those with high school degrees, and a modest increase in all other groups, including those with less than high school. U.S.-born Latino men see declines in the lower levels of educational attainment, and a small increase in the already-high ratio for those with a college degree or higher.

### What about young people?

For younger adults, there is even less evidence of a displacement effect. As immigrants increased their presence in the Long Island economy from 1990 to 2005/07, with undocumented immigrants making up a growing share of all immigrants, the share of U.S.-born women 16 to 24 who are neither in school nor in a job – sometimes called “disconnected youth” – has declined across the

board in peak economic years. For U.S.-born white women, the rate dropped from an already low 8 percent in 1990 to just 6 percent in 2005/07. For U.S.-born Latinas the rate dropped from 16 percent in 1990 to 8 percent in 2005/07, and for African-American women the rate rose slightly between 1990 and 2000, from 14 to 16 percent, then dropped in 2005/07 to 13 percent (Table 8).

The share of U.S.-born young men who are out-of-school and out-of-work is generally flat or even declining a little (measuring peak-to-peak) during this period of strong immigration. For U.S.-born white men, the rate is 7 percent in all three peak years. For Latino men the rate fell from 11 to 8 percent, and African American men see a slight decline, from 19 percent in 1990 to 18 percent in 2005/07.

Eighteen or 19 percent is an alarmingly high share of young African American men to be out of school and out of work. Immigration does not make the high number rise, but it is possible that, without immigration, this rate would have come down. Of course, it is also possible that the in the absence of immigration lower immigration the disconnected rate for young black men would have remained where it is. Unfortunately, the sample size is too small to include Asians in these charts.

Table 7  
LI Employment Ratios Similar to National Trends

Long Island	1990	2000	2005-07	percentage point change,
<b>U.S.-born women</b>	65%	68%	70%	4.2%
White	65%	68%	69%	3.8%
Black	70%	69%	74%	4.3%
Hispanic/Latina	61%	65%	71%	10.3%
Asian	61%	70%	66%	5.0%
<b>U.S.-born men</b>	88%	84%	83%	-4.2%
White	88%	85%	84%	-4.3%
Black	76%	72%	76%	-0.2%
Hispanic/Latina	86%	79%	82%	-3.8%
Asian	79%	85%	85%	5.6%

**Table 7 source:** 1990 Census, 2000 Census and 2005-07 ACS. Employment ratio is total employed 25- to 64-year-olds over total population in that gender age group.

Table 8  
US-born LI Youth Less Likely to Be Non-working  
Non-students by 2007

US-born Women on Long Island	1990	2000	2005-07	percentage point change,
White	8.3%	7.0%	5.9%	-2.3%
Black	14.5%	15.7%	13.0%	-1.4%
Hispanic/Latina	16.3%	12.4%	8.2%	-8.2%
US-born Men on Long Island				
White	7.1%	7.4%	7.1%	0.0%
Black	18.6%	17.8%	18.1%	-0.5%
Hispanic/Latino	11.4%	11.8%	8.3%	-3.1%

**Table 8 source:** FPI analysis of 1990 Census, 2000 Census and 2005-07 ACS.

**Note:** Youth ages 16-24 years old, who are not in school, and do not have a job (but may be seeking work), as a ratio of all in same age/gender group. U.S.-born Asian male subsample is too small to report rate.

### Immigrants in a polarized economy

Long Island is a generally fairly affluent area, despite pockets of poverty. The median annual wage for full-time workers on Long Island was \$52,000 in 2005/07, compared to \$41,000 for New York State and \$38,000 for the U.S. as a whole.

And, Long Island median annual wages increased by 13 percent overall between 1990 and 2005/07, considerably higher than New York State (6 percent) or the United States as a whole (9 percent). Long Island saw growth between the 2000 and 2005/07 peaks, at a time when New York State saw an overall decline of 2 percent in the median annual wage.

Yet, on Long Island as in the rest of the country, those at the very top captured the lion's share of economic gains, while those at the bottom gained very little. For the bottom ten percent of workers, the picture has been rather grim. Annual wages at the 10th percentile have declined by 3 percent between 1990 and 2005-07 (with a small gain by the bottom ten percent of U.S.-born workers, and a loss by the bottom ten percent of foreign-born workers).

Meanwhile, workers at the top decile of Long Island workers – the 90th percentile – saw 20 percent higher annual wages in 2005-07 than in 1990, in inflation-adjusted terms. And the biggest gains

were at the very top. The 97th percentile – only 3 percent of workers are above that level – showed an increase in wages of two-and-a-half times the rate of the median. As a result, while those at the 10th percentile earned \$700 less in 2005/07 than they did in 1990, in inflation-corrected dollars, and those at the median earned just \$5,800 more, those at the 97th percentile earned \$50,000 more than they did in 1990 (Figure 7).

It is important to note, too, that these basic numbers show only the tip of the iceberg of income polarization. The American Community Survey does not allow us to look with much precision at the top 1 percent. And, the gains of top earners reported here reflect only wage and salary earnings; the gains would be even more pronounced if the data included dividends and capital gains. Worth noting, too, is that while the median annual wage and salary earnings on Long Island increased at a moderate rate, the average annual hours worked increased by 41 hours, or the equivalent of one week of extra work every year, so that the added earnings were in part due to people working longer hours.

The fact that the top one percent of workers took so much of the economy's overall gains sets the context for any discussion of wages. This economic concentration is closely connected to the extraordinary returns in the finance industry, growing executive pay, and other factors that seem generally unrelated to immigration.

At the lower wage levels, however, immigration may be a relevant part of the story. U.S.-born workers show at least some modest gains at all wage levels. Although overall wages at the 10th percentile overall actually decreased, the decrease reflects a drop in wages of immigrant workers. Wages for U.S.-born workers at the 10th percentile increased by 4 percent – not very impressive gains for nearly two decades of growth, to be sure, but still movement in a positive direction.

Although we do not have detailed statistics for undocumented workers, the low end of the labor market is of course where undocumented workers are concentrated, often subject to wage theft, being paid off the books, and other employer violations.

There are significant differences for U.S.-born workers when we break median wage trends down by gender. Annual wages for U.S.-born women started well below those of U.S.-born men; the overall median for U.S.-born women was \$35,000/year in 1990, compared to an overall median of \$60,000/year for U.S.-born men (in inflation-adjusted dollars). By 2005/07, U.S.-born women saw a considerable increase in median annual wage and salary earnings of 29 percent overall, in inflation-adjusted dollars, with U.S.-born white, black, and Latina women each rising by at least 20 percent. Overall, wages for women on Long Island were rising fairly steadily over the three economic peaks, although there is still a long distance between women's pay and the pay of men (Figure 8).


Wages for U.S.-born men start at a higher level, but have generally shown less growth. African American men started in 1990 with the lowest wages of any racial/ethnic group, and gained just 4 percent from 1990 to 2005/07. U.S.-born Latinos and Asians also gained very modestly, just 8 percent after adjusting for inflation. Only white men made significant gains in wages, and even they gained just 14 percent in peak-to-peak comparisons over the past two business cycles, including a period with very fast growth in the overall economy, the late 1990s.

The overall stagnation of wages for U.S.-born men and polarization of the economy in this period are reflected even more clearly when looking at wages by level of education. The median wages of the shrinking number of white U.S.-born men with less than a high school degree declined by 12 percent. Wages stagnated for U.S.-born white men with high school or some college, while those with a college degree or more saw a gain of 19 percent.

For U.S.-born black men, all of the gains come from their increasing levels of education. African American men lost earning power at each educational level; they gained overall only because the share of those with at least some college increased. In other words, the number of African American men making college-level wages increased, but the earnings commanded by a college education did not (Figure 9).

At the same time, it is important to note that there seem to be two distinct periods here for U.S.-born black men. Between 1990 and 2000, they made at least modest gains at nearly all education levels. The losses over the full period are the result of a steep loss of wages at all levels between 2000 and 2005/07. There is real reason for concern here, but it is important to note that immigration – both legal and illegal – was strong in both periods. Although it is possible and even likely that immigrants have some impact on black men in the labor force, it is clearly not the only or even the dominant factor affecting earnings.


Figure 7  
Wages Up Sharply for Top Earners,  
but Far Less for Others on LI



**Fig. 7 source:** FPI analysis of 1990 and 2000 Census, 2005-07 ACS.

**Note:** Universe: 16 years and older, employed full-time in the civilian labor force. Earnings in 2007 CPI-U dollars. 99th percentile (top 1 percent) is only a broad indication of earnings polarization; top-coding of the data makes an accurate estimate difficult to get from the American Community Survey data.


Figure 8  
US-born White Men Post Wage Gains,  
Except HS Dropouts



**Source:** FPI analysis of Census and ACS.

**Note:** Universe: 16 years and older, employed full-time in the civilian labor force. Earnings in 2007 CPI-U dollars.

Figure 9  
**Black Male Wage Declines at Each Educational Level, But Their Education Gains Result in Overall Pay Rise**



**Source:** FPI analysis of Census and ACS.

**Note:** Universe: 16 years and older, employed full-time in the civilian labor force. Earnings in 2007 CPI-U dollars.

### Occupation and industry shifts

The increasing immigrant share of the economy has been one major shift in the Long Island economy over the past two decades, but it is hardly the only one. A much bigger factor in the economy, and a bigger reason for wage stagnation among lower-skilled workers, is the changing industrial structure of the jobs available on Long Island. The data above all refer to employment of Long Island residents, whether or not they work on Long Island. A quarter of jobholders living on Long Island commute to work, mostly to New York City, 23 percent of U.S.-born workers and 30 percent of foreign-born. Overall commuter rates have changed surprisingly little in the 20 years since 1990.

A big part of the story of middle-wage jobs, however, is the shift in the type of jobs located on Long Island. As in so many other parts of the country, Long Island was losing manufacturing jobs that paid a solid middle-class wage, while it was gaining jobs in less well-paying industries.

Looking at the jobs located on Long Island using the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, we see big losses in manufacturing jobs in both between the 1990 peak and the 2000 peak, as well as from the 2000 peak to the period just before the peak in 2005/07. (The QCEW's industry classification system

changed along the way.) In both periods, there were substantial peak-to-peak losses in manufacturing jobs: manufacturing lost 38,000 jobs between 1990 and 2000, and 18,000 between 2000 and 2005-07. In both cases it was the industry with the largest job loss. These were jobs that on average paid about \$55,000 almost \$10,000 above the overall average (Table 9).

The industries showing substantial job gains were mostly at or below the average wage: services and retail trade making up the biggest number in the 1990 to 2000 period, and health care and social assistance, accommodations and food services in the 2000 to 2005-07 period. In both cases there was also growth in generally well-paying construction jobs, but not nearly at the level of job loss in manufacturing.

Looking at *occupations* rather than industry (and using Census and ACS data rather than QCEW, so we can distinguish U.S.- and foreign-born workers, and thereby seeing all workers living on Long Island rather than those working on Long Island), we can see the same broad growth in service jobs and decline in blue-collar jobs, as well as a growth in managerial and professional and decline in technical, sales and administrative support jobs, as well as an increase in the small number of farming, fishing and forestry occupations (driven mostly by gardening and landscaping jobs).

In the highest-wage jobs, managerial and professional specialties, U.S.-born workers are shifting slightly into the highest-wage jobs, managerial and professional specialties, where they increased by five percent the number of jobs they held despite the overall decline of 8 percent in the U.S.-born working-age population. In these jobs, U.S.-born workers saw an average increase in peak-to-peak median wages of 20 percent over the past two business cycles, while foreign-born workers saw an increase of 9 percent (Table 10).

Technical, sales and administrative support saw an overall decline in the number of jobs, driven by a loss of 32,000 jobs in administrative support (42,000 for U.S.-born, as immigrants gained 10,000 administrative support jobs). The loss of so many administrative support jobs is likely due to an increasing use of computer technology and a decreasing number of receptionists, secretarial, and related positions. The number of U.S.-born sales clerks and cashiers also declined significantly, by 16,000, as the number of immigrant sales clerks and cashiers increased by 7,000. Median wages for U.S.-born technical, sales and administrative support workers increased by 19 percent, while foreign-born workers in the same occupations saw an increase of 5 percent.

U.S.-born workers held about the same number of service jobs in service occupations in 2005/07 as they did in 1990, despite an 8 percent decline in the U.S.-born working age population (16- to 24-years old). These are jobs that paid relatively low wages in 1990 and remained basically flat for both U.S.- and foreign-born workers since then. The median for U.S.-born workers was \$40,000 in both

1990 and 2005/07, in inflation-adjusted terms. (Growth in wages in specific service occupations between 1990 and 2005/07 ranged from -2 percent for dental health and nursing aids to 13 percent for private household and personal service. (See appendix in my full report for data.)

The increasing number of farming, fishing and forestry jobs is driven by an increasing number of gardeners and groundskeepers. There are some 4,000 more people hired as gardeners and groundskeepers today than in 1990. Perhaps surprisingly, the number of U.S.-born workers in farming, fishing and forestry has remained almost exactly the same, while the number of immigrants has nearly doubled. Median wages for U.S.-born workers have increased by 12 percent, to \$36,000 per year.

Blue-collar jobs saw an overall decline, with the number of immigrants increasing and U.S.-born workers declining. But the trends were very different in the manufacturing and construction. Looking at those blue-collar occupations in the manufacturing industry, we can see that there are about 3,000 more immigrants working in blue-collar jobs in manufacturing – not nearly enough to account for the 31,000 blue-collar jobs lost in manufacturing by U.S.-born workers between 1990 and 2005/07 (Table 11).

By contrast, there are 11,000 more immigrants working in blue-collar construction jobs in 2005/07 than there were in 1990, and 1,000 fewer U.S.-born workers, a decline of 2 percent. Over the same period, there is an overall decline in the U.S.-born working-age (16-64) population of 8 percent. In other words, while there is a decreasing number of U.S.-born workers in blue-collar construction jobs, the decrease is not as great as the overall lower number of U.S.-born workers on Long Island overall. The increasing share of immigrants in construction is due primarily to a growing construction sector in which immigrants are taking newly created jobs.

This is an area where undocumented immigrants are playing a particularly large role—The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that about one in ten construction workers in New York’s downstate suburbs is undocumented, and roughly one in five undocumented immigrant workers is in construction (see Fiscal Policy Institute, *Working for a Better Life*.) There is little doubt that undocumented immigrants are paid lower wages, bringing down the average wages for immigrants and are perhaps also restraining gains for U.S.-born workers.

Between 1990 and 2005/07, U.S.-born workers lost a significant number of blue-collar manufacturing jobs, but very few of these jobs have gone to immigrants—for the most part, they are jobs that were lost due to the downsizing or moving away of aerospace and other manufacturing firms. In construction, a modest number of

blue-collar jobs have shifted from U.S.-born workers to immigrants – roughly 1,000 overall on Long Island. A far more noticeable effect is that as the construction industry has grown, the new jobs created have gone in large part to immigrants. In both industries, the wages of U.S.-born worker have increased modestly, 13 percent in construction and 9 percent in manufacturing, in inflation-adjusted terms. Wages for immigrants in both cases started lower and declined.

U.S.-born men without college degrees have seen stagnating wages over this period, but immigrants seem not to have played more than a minor role in that change. Economic polarization, manufacturing job loss, and low wages in the service occupations are due to factors independent of immigration. In construction, while it’s possible that U.S.-born workers might have had more blue-collar construction jobs if it weren’t for immigration, it does not look like immigrants have displaced many of the U.S.-born workers already in construction or brought down wages for U.S.-born workers.

**Table 9**  
**LI Shifts from Manf. to Lower-Wage Service Jobs**

Industry Change 1990 to 2000	Change in number of jobs 1990 to 2000	Average wage in 2000
Services	82,625	\$44,505
Retail Trade	11,948	\$26,983
Construction	8,617	\$51,188
Transportation and Public Utilities	6,095	\$55,387
Wholesale Trade	3,898	\$63,683
Agriculture, Mining & Unclassified	3,383	\$30,928
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	1,395	\$71,541
Public Administration	-3,564	\$57,101
Manufacturing	-38,328	\$55,513
<b>All Industries</b>	<b>\$55,513</b>	<b>\$46,912</b>

**Table 9 source:** FPI analysis of QCEW 1990 and 2000. Wages in 2007 dollars.



Table 10  
**US-born Wage Gains in Broad Occupations,  
but Pay Drop or Stagnation in Services and Blue-collar Jobs**

<b>Median annual wages by broad occupation</b>	1990	2000	2005-07	change 1990 to 2005-07
<b>Managerial and professional specialty occupations</b>	61,480	66,220	72,432	18%
US-Born	61,480	67,424	73,570	20%
Foreign-Born	61,480	66,220	67,258	9%
<b>Technical, sales, and administrative support occupations</b>	38,425	42,381	45,440	18%
US-Born	38,425	43,344	45,536	19%
Foreign-Born	38,425	39,250	40,355	5%
<b>Service occupations</b>	36,888	38,528	33,732	-9%
US-Born	39,962	44,548	40,476	1%
Foreign-Born	26,129	26,488	26,903	3%
<b>Blue Collar</b>	46,110	48,160	46,548	1%
US-Born	46,550	51,772	52,619	13%
Foreign-Born	36,888	31,304	32,457	-12%
<b>Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations</b>	31,509	28,174	25,868	-18%
US-Born	32,277	38,528	36,216	12%
Foreign-Born	23,055	19,264	21,250	-8%

**Table 10 source:** FPI analysis of Census and ACS data. Note: Universe is persons 16 years and older, employed full-time in the civilian labor force with earnings of over \$100.

Table 11  
**Big US-born Manf. Job Losses Not Matched by Immigrant Gains.  
 Net Construction Job Gains by Immigrants**

Change, 1990 to 2005-07	Mechanics and repairers	Construction trades	Precision production	Machine operators	Fabricators	Drivers including heavy equipment operators	Laborers and other material handlers	Total	Percent change
<b>Construction Industry</b>									
Foreign-Born	1,153	6,251	-110	-53	138	203	3,200	10,782	136%
US-Born	1,628	-2,649	-854	-211	-253	-528	1,881	-986	-2%
<b>Manufacturing Industry</b>									
Foreign-Born	-114	-286	-527	2,187	224	201	1,159	2,844	17%
US-Born	-3,087	-1,306	-7,038	-9,091	-8,082	-1,032	-1,351	-30,987	-60%

**Source:** FPI analysis of 1990 and 2000 Census, and 2005-07 ACS.

### Concluding remarks

This analysis indicates that as immigrants have come to play an increasingly important role in the Long Island economy, they have for the most part been readily absorbed into the labor market. Only a relatively small portion of Long Islanders seem to be negatively affected by immigration, while most U.S.-born workers have done fairly well. The consistent area of concern is the effect on jobs and wages for the shrinking number of men without much formal education, especially for African American men.

The analysis finds very little basis for the frequently voiced concern that immigrants may be displacing U.S.-born workers. Indeed, women of all racial and ethnic groups and at all educational levels are making long-term employment gains. The vast majority of U.S.-born men see no “pushing out” effect, even at a time of significant increase in immigration and a growing share of undocumented immigrants. The one group of U.S.-born men for whom there does seem to be some job loss related to immigration is the shrinking but still significant number of black men with high school degrees or less.

Looking at wages, the report finds that U.S.-born women of all race/ethnic groups have generally made increases – starting at a fairly low level but rising significantly. U.S.-born men have done less well, but still saw overall gains. The small and shrinking number of U.S.-born white men with less than high school, however, have seen real losses in wages. And, African American men have seen wage losses at all educational levels, posting an overall gain only because of a significant increase in the share of African American men with at least some college experience.

Areas where we see negative outcomes for U.S.-born workers – men with lower levels of education – are among the areas where undocumented workers are most concentrated in the workforce. These are not the only areas where undocumented workers are concentrated. Immigrant women without legal work status, for example, are also working in jobs such as child-care providers that may in fact be helping the labor force outcomes of U.S.-born women. But, federal immigration reform is clearly needed as part of an effort to improve outcomes for all workers.

Given the importance of immigrants to the Long Island economy, as well as the social reality of immigrants' presence, it would seem more productive to focus on how to improve outcomes for those who may see negative impacts than to forgo the overall contribution of immigration – or worse still, to stifle the overall economy by creating a climate that is hostile to immigrants, or to Latinos. The possibility of an anti-immigrant environment is a clear concern to business leaders on Long Island, who fear that it could make the area less attractive to U.S. and foreign-born workers alike, as has been frequently expressed by the Long Island Association.

Addressing the ways in which immigrants may be having a negative impact should be a clear priority for Long Island policymakers. Attention to further improvements in the high school graduation rates, establishing a stronger floor in the low-wage labor market, and a focus on job training and career advancement might be considered not only good policy in general but also critical components of a sound approach to immigration.

In a volatile political context, Long Island business, political, and nonprofit leaders should be clearly aware of the overall positive role immigration has played in the local economy, and the fact that for most workers immigration – even including illegal immigration – has been compatible with wage growth and steady employment outcomes. Advocating for federal immigration reform while making sure that Long Island develops and maintains a climate that embraces this growing multicultural reality will be important components of sustainable economic growth for the region.

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*David Dyssegaard Kallick directs the Immigration Research Initiative at the Fiscal Policy Institute. This article was adapted from FPI's longer report: *The Changing Profile of Long Island's Economy: How US-born Workers Have Fared as Immigration Has Grown* <[www.fiscalpolicy.org](http://www.fiscalpolicy.org)>, released at the Hofstra University forum on "Immigration's Impacts on Long Island" (11/17/2010). The forum was organized by the Center for Study of Labor & Democracy and the National Center for Suburban Studies.*

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#### NOTES

1. See, for example, the Fiscal Policy Institute's 2009 report *Immigrants and the Economy* <[www.fiscalpolicy.org](http://www.fiscalpolicy.org)>
2. Passel, Jeffrey S. and D'Vera Cohn, "A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States," Pew Hispanic Center, April 14, 2009, Table B1.
3. Throughout this period, labor unions may play a stabilizing or positive role on wages for many workers, helping equalize the wages of men and women, and helping improve wages for at least some workers at the middle and bottom of the wage ladder. For a discussion of immigrants and labor unions, see Gregory DeFreitas and Bhaswati Sengupta, "The State of New York Unions 2007," *Regional Labor Review* (Fall 2007). On Long Island, labor union density is comparatively high, at 27 percent of the labor force—well more than double the U.S. average of 12 percent and about the same as the rate in nearby New York City. On Long Island, labor union density has also held about steady throughout the period of this study, even as the rates have declined in the U.S. as a whole and in New York City, according to Unions are playing a significant role for immigrants as well, that report finds, particularly for those who have become naturalized citizens. On Long Island, 19 percent of all immigrant workers are covered by a union contract (for naturalized citizens the rate is 25 percent and for non-citizens it is 11 percent, compared to 28 percent for U.S.-born workers).

## Power, Protest and the Public Schools

Melissa F. Weiner (2010). *Power, Protest and the Public Schools. Jewish and African American Struggles in New York City*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Review by Alan Singer

My father Mendel was born on the Lower East Side of New York City in 1920. He eventually graduated from Straubenmuller Textile High School in Chelsea in 1939. His brother Abie was born in 1918 and their older sister Kayla in 1916. Their father Zalman arrived in New York in 1909 from Galicia in Poland, now the Ukraine. Their mother Fayga followed him four years later. My father and his siblings spoke Yiddish at home and in the street, first learning English in school. Their mother never learned to speak English. Their father could pray in Hebrew, but he was a garment worker, not a religious scholar. He spoke Yiddish and workplace Polish and English. Zalman was a loyal member of the ILGWU but never an activist. Katie toyed with socialism as a teenager. Abie and Mendel were always street kids. When they misbehaved, which appears to have been frequently, at least for Abie, Kayla would be called to the office because their parents would have nothing to do with school.

My father-in-law Ed Yanowitz's family migrated to the Lower East Side from Rumania. His father was a furrier, the fur workers union was communist, so Ed and his older brother were communists as teens and young men. They also spoke English and Yiddish. Hebrew was something you mumbled prayers in if you prayed, not something you understood or spoke, and certainly not at the core of their identity as Jews. These boys grew up during the Great Depression and cared little about school and even less about Hebrew. I asked my father and he said as a kid he did not know anybody who spoke Hebrew and he never met anyone who did until he married my stepmother in the 1960s. She had a brother who had migrated to Israel after World War II.

I, on the other hand, went to school in the 1960s and I have studied the period as an historian. My elementary school in the Bronx was involved in a one-way busing plan starting in the 1960s and a small number of Black children from Harlem were integrated into the school. In 1963-1964, Reverend Milton Galamison led a citywide campaign for the racial integration of New York City schools. It was not until the late sixties when the collapse of the civil rights movement and White flight to the suburbs made school integration virtually impossible that the major focus of school activists in the Black community was on community control and what we would now call an Afro-centric curriculum.

Maybe my father and I remember things wrong, but I don't think so. Instead, I think *Power, Protest and the Public Schools, Jewish and African American Struggles in New York City* by Melissa Weiner is more a work of imagination than of history. Central to Weiner's thesis is that the struggle of "Jewish parents" in New York City in the 1920s and 1930s to have Hebrew taught in the public schools as a college preparatory language and the struggle of Black parents in the 1950s to include more African American history and culture in the curriculum were fundamentally similar and demonstrate the capacity of grassroots movements to reshape powerful institutions. It is the story of the way she would have liked things to have been, with parallel struggles fought by two disempowered groups in different eras, not the history of what actually took place.

Part of the problem may be that Weiner, an assistant professor at Quinnipiac University, is a sociologist rather than an historian or a specialist in educational issues. The book is an outgrowth of her doctoral dissertation in the Sociology Department at the University of Minnesota. In it, she manages to mention every current academic cliché about whiteness, privilege, racialization, discourses, counternarratives, and feminist and critical methodologies, but her bibliography does not list one interview with a participant in either of the struggles. While Weiner's goal is to demonstrate similarities in the struggles fought by Blacks and Jews to improve public education in their communities, a more balanced study, and a more useful one, would have explored both similarities and differences.

Weiner acknowledges that the campaign to have Hebrew taught in public schools was led by upper class better established German Jews embarrassed by the city's Yiddish speaking population and did not involve the millions of new Eastern European immigrants (pp. 99-100). It was neither a grassroots nor a parent-based movement. She never discusses communists in either the Jewish or Black communities, despite the fact that in the 1930s the city councilman from Harlem was a Black communist elected by a coalition of left-wing Blacks and Jews. She ignores the major historical and demographic events of the periods so the struggles she presents lack historical context. New York City schools were not vehicles of advancement for Jews in the 1920s and 1930, after

all there was a Great Depression. But with U.S. capitalist dominance of the post-World War II world, suburbanization, and the vast expansion of white-collar work, Jews were able to benefit from public education. Meanwhile, as both Ira Katznelson (in *When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America*) and Marvin Harris (in *America Now: The Anthropology of a Changing Culture*) have pointed out, Blacks were effectively barred from housing, jobs, and schools, until after the great wave that had benefited the Jews. I think the economic changes taking place explain what happened much better than non-specific theories of Whiteness applied by Weiner.

In addition, Weiner barely mentions the labor movement or Martin Luther King, and I could find no reference in the book or the index to Malcolm X, who was a prominent street preacher and activist in Harlem during the 1950s and 1960s. The Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and the Black Nationalist movement of the 1960s and 1970s do not exist in her universe. This is a doctoral dissertation gone wild by an author determined to prove her theses,

not a work of considered scholarship or a contribution to the field. As a side comment, cover review notes were provided by Pedro Noguera of the New York University Steinhardt School. I have a lot of respect for Noguera as an academic and as an activist, and I agree with his comment that “[t]he power of parent organizing as a means to reform schools and make them more responsive to the communities they serve has been underappreciated largely because the history of past efforts has not been well documented.” However, Weiner’s work does not do much to change this. It is as if Noguera made a generic observation without reading very much of this book.

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# CALL FOR BOOK REVIEWS

***Regional Labor Review*** welcomes original reviews of significant books on employment-relevant topics that are of interest to our readers. We publish three different types of reviews:

1. Reviews of individual books. These reviews should be 1200-1500 words in length.
2. Review essays encompassing three or four recent books that bring together an important literature on significant employment and/or labor topics. These reviews should be about 2500 words in length.
3. Ambitious examinations of bodies of literature on employment and/or labor topics that should be better known by our readers. These reviews should also be about 2500 words in length.

Reviews should be submitted within sixty days of receipt of the book. All reviews should be submitted in both printed form (to our office mailing address below) and in a WORD for Windows file emailed to **laborstudies@hofstra.edu**.

*Regional Labor Review*  
200 Barnard Hall  
104 Hofstra University  
Hempstead, NY 11549  
email: [laborstudies@hofstra.edu](mailto:laborstudies@hofstra.edu).

For a sample of recent reviews, see the archived past issues on our website: [www.hofstra.edu/cld](http://www.hofstra.edu/cld).

# CALENDAR

## LOCAL & NATIONAL EVENTS: FALL-WINTER 2010/2011

### NY METRO

**Oct. 21** - Andrew Stetner (Deputy Policy Director, National Employment Law Project), Susan Joffe (Hofstra Law School), Martha Weissel (Hofstra Business School) and Gregory DeFreitas (Economics & Labor Studies, Hofstra) speak on "Unemployment and the Safety Net: 75 Years of Unemployment Insurance." From 12:45-2:10 at East Multipurpose Room, Student Center, Hofstra University. Free admission; first-come, first-seated.

**Oct. 21** - The Workplace Project's 18th Anniversary Gala, "a celebration of food, dancing, fun and immigrant rights." Meet new Executive Director Omar Angel Perez and join in recognition of community leaders from Domestic Workers United, Laborers Union Local 79 and LCLAA. Starts at 6:30 at Chateau La Mer, Lindenhurst, NY. For info, call: 516-565-5377.

**Nov. 17** - "Immigration's Impacts on the Long Island Economy," a new report is released and discussed by: David Kallick (Senior Fellow, Fiscal Policy Institute), Pearl Kamer (Chief Economist, Long Island Association), Patrick Duggan (former Nassau County Deputy Executive for Economic Development) and Omar Angel Perez (Executive Director, The Workplace Project). From 1:55-3:30 in the Guthart Cultural Center Theater, Hofstra University. Sponsored by Hofstra's Labor Studies Program and National Center for Suburban Studies. Free admission; first-come, first-seated.

**Dec. 7** - Labor & Employment Relations Association of Long Island's Meeting. At Nassau Co. Bar Association, 15th and West Streets, Mineola, NY. For info. call: 516/746-9307, or visit: [www.lilera.org](http://www.lilera.org).

**Dec. 10** - "Is Collective Bargaining Broken?" Sixth Annual Rutgers Labor-Management Conference. At Rutgers University School of Management & Labor Relations, New Brunswick, NJ. For info. call 732/932-9504 or visit: [www.smlr.rutgers.edu](http://www.smlr.rutgers.edu).

**Dec. 10** - Human Rights Day. Series of candle-light vigils and other events focused on child labor and sweatshop abuses. Start of nation-wide Annual Holiday Season of Conscience. For info. visit website: [www.nlcnet.org](http://www.nlcnet.org).

**Dec. 18** - "The Impact of Wall Street on the NY Economy," Business and Labor Coalition of NY forum at 481 Eighth Ave. in Manhattan. For more info., visit [www.balconynewyork.com/wallstreet2010](http://www.balconynewyork.com/wallstreet2010).

### NATIONAL

Jan. 3-5, 2011 - Annual National Meetings of Labor & Employment Relations Association (formerly IRRA) at ASSA Meetings in Denver, CO. For info. call: 608/262-2762, or visit [www.lera.uiuc.edu](http://www.lera.uiuc.edu)

#### NOTE TO READERS

If you know of upcoming labor-related meetings or conferences, collective bargaining contract expirations or renewals, or other events you would like considered for our next Calendar, please send us a brief description, together with the time, place, contact person, and their telephone number. Either fax this information, with a cover sheet addressed to *Regional Labor Review*, to fax # **516-463-6519**; or email us at: [laborstudies@hofstra.edu](mailto:laborstudies@hofstra.edu).



### RELEASE DATES FOR MONTHLY LABOR MARKET INDICATORS

2010 RELEASE DATE	NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT & UNEMPLOYMENT	NATIONAL JOB OPENINGS & TURNOVER	NATIONAL REAL EARNINGS	REGIONAL US METRO EMPLOYMENT	REGIONAL NEW YORK EMPLOYMENT
September	3	8	17	29	16
October	8	7	15		21
November	5	9	17	3	18
December	34	7	15	7	16
January	7	12	15	5	20
February	5	9	14	2	18

Sources: National Statistics - U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS): *The Employment Situation; Job Openings and Labor Turnover (JOLT)*; Real Earnings; and *Metro Area Employment & Unemployment*. <http://www.bls.gov>

NY State and Local Statistics - NY State Dept. of Labor: Monthly Press Release. <http://www.labor.state.ny.us>.





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# CALL FOR PAPERS

**Regional Labor Review**, a refereed multidisciplinary journal now in its 13th year of publication, invites submissions of original articles on a range of subjects that we hope to explore in upcoming issues. These include the following:

- ▶ **Youth employment, wages and career trends**
- ▶ **Occupational safety and health insurance issues**
- ▶ **Developments in worker rights to privacy and collective bargaining**
- ▶ **The working poor and government safety net policies**
- ▶ **Immigrant workers: their impacts on local industries and on unionization**
- ▶ **Racial, ethnic, and gender inequalities in earnings and occupational status**
  - ▶ **Union organizing successes and failures: recent case studies of a specific industry or a large employer**
- ▶ **Labor Law: new laws and/or influential cases with broad implications**
- ▶ **Labor History of New York City & its metropolitan region in the 19th and/or 20th centuries**

We welcome articles on these issues in a national and international context, so long as their relevance to New York workers is made clear. Articles should be 1,000 - 7,000 words in length and written in a clear style, without academic jargon, and accessible to a broad audience. All text, tables, charts, and references should be consistent with earlier issues of **RLR** (see our Style Sheet, available online at: [www.hofstra.edu/cld](http://www.hofstra.edu/cld)). Three print copies should be submitted along with a PC diskette copy (formatted in Word for Windows). Manuscripts can only be returned if a self-addressed, stamped envelope is enclosed. Copyright can revert to author upon publication.

Please send papers or article proposals to: Regional Labor Review  
200 Barnard Hall  
104 Hofstra University  
Hempstead, NY 11549

Or via email to: [laborstudies@hofstra.edu](mailto:laborstudies@hofstra.edu).

For a sample of recent articles, email us for a free sample of our latest issue and visit our archive of past articles on the website: [www.hofstra.edu/cld](http://www.hofstra.edu/cld).

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I would like to help make possible more frequent issues of the **Regional Labor Review** and to support the other activities of the Center for the Study of Labor and Democracy. Enclosed is my contribution of:

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## Center for the Study of Labor and Democracy

104 Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY 11549



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*The Center for the Study of Labor & Democracy*, publisher of the *Regional Labor Review*, is a research institute that aims to contribute to public education and debate about important labor issues. CLD pursues a distinctively interdisciplinary approach to labor problems and institutions, extending from the local Long Island and New York City labor markets to the national and global economies. This approach is designed to both inform and stimulate discussion of policy alternatives that promote sustainable improvements in living standards, fairness in economic opportunities, and democratic decision-making processes throughout the world.

### The Center's Main Activities Include:

- ▶ sponsorship of original research projects
- ▶ designing and implementing surveys
- ▶ organizing lectures, workshops, seminars, debates, and conferences
- ▶ publication of the **Regional Labor Review** and a working papers series
- ▶ hosting visiting international scholars
- ▶ maintaining an active web site on the Internet: <http://www.hofstra.edu/cld>
- ▶ serving as a resource center for and active liaison between students, researchers, community and labor organizations, employers, and government officials.

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